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CLEAR AND CONVINCING TO WHOM? THE FALSE
CLAIMS ACT AND ITS BURDEN OF PROOF
STANDARD: WHY THE GOVERNMENT
NEEDS A BIG STICK
John Terrence A. Rosenthal*
Robert T. Alter4
The conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large
arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence-
economic, political, even spiritual-is felt in every city, every state house,
every office of the Federal Government.... Yet we must not fail to compre-
hend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all in-
volved; so is the very structure of our society.
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition
of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-in-
dustrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power
exists and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties
or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert
and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of huge indus-
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trial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals,
so that security and liberty may prosper together.'
I have considerable experience in letting public contracts; and I have
never yet found a contractor who, if not watched, would not leave the Gov-
ernment holding the bag.
2




The False Claims Act (FCA) is the Government's primary statu-
tory weapon for deterring private commercial contractors, from whom
the Government procures goods and services, from submitting false or
fraudulent claims for payment. In 1986, Congress responded to re-
search indicating widespread fraud in the government procurement
system and amended the FCA to provide the Government with a
stronger weapon to deter such conduct. Since then, some critics, in-
cluding legal scholars and economists, have argued that the 1986
amendments to the FCA have created negative consequences in the
government procurement system and that these consequences are
burdening taxpayers rather than benefiting them.4 In defending
their position, some critics of the current FCA have argued that the
1986 amendments degraded the FCA's character as a civil fraud stat-
1 Farewell Address, The Dwight Eisenhower Library (visited March 25, 2000) <http://
redbud.lbjlib.utexas.edu/eisenhower/farewell.htm>; see also 2 STEPHEN E. AMBROSE,
EISENHOWER: THE PRESIDENT 612 (1984) (quoting President Dwight D. Eisenhower's
Farewell Address).
2 ALONZO L. HAMBY, MAN OF THE PEOPLE: A LIFE OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 249 (1995)
(quoting then-Senator Harry S. Truman).
3 EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 174 (1949) (quoting an unidenti-
fied businessman).
4 See FREDERICK A. DUNBAR, NAT'L ECON. RES. ASS'N, THE 1986 AMENDMENTS TO
THE FALSE CLAIMS Acr: Do THEY HELP OR HURT THE PUBLIC? (1997); William E.
Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation in Government Procurement
Markets, in 6 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 201 (Ernest Gellhorn & Nelson Lund eds., 1998)
[hereinafter Kovacic, A Deterrent]; C. Stanley Dees, The Tenth Annual Gilbert A. Cuneo
Lecture: The Role of Procurement Lawyers in the Era of Reduced Defense Spending, 141 MiL. L.
REV. 199 (1993); The Civil False Claims Act: An Obstacle to Effect Acquisition Re-
form (Mayer, Brown & Platt, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
[hereinafter An Obstacle]. By arguing against the FCA as it presently stands, these
critics seem to disregard the prophetic words of one of America's most respected
generals and presidents. See Farewell Address, supra note 1.
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ute.5 Given the Act's "preponderance of the evidence" burden of
proof standard, critics insist that "it is too easy for the Government to
prevail in marginal cases" and that the "risk of loss weighs far more
heavily on defendants than plaintiffs."6 "There is no obvious reason for
loosening the proof requirements that apply in purely commercial set-
tings simply because the Govemment-or a private party standing in
the Government's shoes-is the plaintiff."7 They argue that taxpayers
would benefit if the FCA mimicked the civil fraud law that equity
courts developed and common law courts later applied, the civil fraud
law that some courts still apply today in cases involving private com-
mercial transactions.
5 See An Obstacle, supra note 4, at 25 ("The False Claims Act's relaxed standard
of proof is inconsistent with the more stringent requirements for showing fraud in the
private sector.").
6 Id. 1-2.
7 Id. at 25 (emphasis added). Actually there are at least three very good reasons
why the government should have a lower burden of proof standard in instances of
fraud committed by government contractors. First, the government supplies contrac-
tors with tremendous amounts of capital for research and development. Contractors
then turn around and use the information gleaned from this government-sponsored
research and development for commercial gain without fully repaying the govern-
ment for this commercial gain. The government's research and development support
for these companies is so great that companies in Europe argued this constituted
subsidies for trade purposes. See Paulo Carozza, Remarks During International Busi-
ness Transactions Class at Notre Dame Law School (Jan.-Apr. 1999). In one in-
stance, a commercial plane manufacturer derived almost all of the technology for its
commercial plane from the technology acquired from the development of a military
aircraft supported by the Department of Defense. See id. When the government does
retain rights to the technology gained by contractors through government-supported
research and development, the government gives contractors cut-rate royalty agree-
ments to use the technology for commercial gain. See Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1983) (describing contractual provisions in
government research and development contracts).
Second, the government actively markets contractor goods to foreign countries
using taxpayer dollars. The government and its agents do this in the name ofjobs at
home, but the process still adds up to increased commercial profits for contractors
without paying for the advertising. See infra note 18 and accompanying text for a
description of this process in action.
Third, the government relaxes certain anti-trust standards for contractors in the
name ofjobs and national security. This costs the government and taxpayers by de-
creasing competition and through various subsidies paid to government contractors
for the effects of the mergers.
These are three very good reasons why the government should have a lower bur-
den of proof standard for the FCA because often the contractors who have perpe-
trated the fraud have acquired huge commercial benefits from the government
without fully paying for those benefits.
200
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW[
In arguing for a "clear and convincing" burden of proof standard
for the FCA, professed reformers maintain that this standard is more
appropriate for a statute aimed at deterring "genuine fraud."s For
these critics, "genuine fraud," the type of fraud the statute should de-
ter, represents an activity that equates to "common law fraud."9 They
insist that the "time-tested rules"10 of common law civil actions for
fraud and deceit, including the "clear and convincing" burden of
proof standard, are far more appropriate for the FCA than the Act's
present "preponderance of the evidence" standard. This Article will
demonstrate that these critics misconstrue the history of civil fraud
law,'1 the current status of the same,12 and the nature of the present
8 See An Obstacle, supra note 4, at 1.
9 Id. at 26.
10 Id. at 17.
11 "A higher standard of proof [for fraud] apparently arose in courts of equity
when the chancellor faced claims that were unenforceable at law because of the Stat-
ute of Wills, the Statute of Frauds, or the parol evidence rule." Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388 n.27 (1982). See infra Part II.B for a detailed discus-
sion of the history of the preponderance and clear and convincing standards in civil
fraud cases.
12 See, e.g., Compagnie De Reassurance D'ile De France v. New England Reinsur-
ance Corp., 57 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Massachusetts has not adopted a 'clear and
convincing' standard in cases of fraud."); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d
1307, 1320 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that the plaintiff's burden of proof in fraud cases
in Alabama is by preponderance of the evidence, but that the character of such evi-
dence must be clear and convincing); Eckholt v. American Bus. Info., Inc., 873 F.
Supp. 526, 531 (D. Kan. 1994) (stating that under Kansas law, "the burden of proving
fraud is by a preponderance of the evidence, but that evidence must be clear, convinc-
ing, and satisfactory" (quoting Modem Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Cinderella Homes,
Inc., 226 Kan. 70 (1979))); Saxton v. Harris, 395 P.2d 71, 72 (Alaska 1964) ("No more
than a preponderance of evidence is necessary to establish fraud."); Malakul v. Altech
Ark., Inc., 766 S.W.2d 433, 435-36 (Ark. 1989) ("Preponderance of the evidence is
required to establish fraud in obtaining a contract by fraudulent representation.");
Barrett v. Bank of Am., 229 Cal. Rptr. 16, 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ("[P]reponderance
of the evidence required in most civil cases, including actions for fraud."); Liodas v.
Sahadi, 562 P.2d 316, 323 n.8 (Cal. 1977) ("[W]e note it has long been settled that in
civil cases even a criminal act may be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
Surely the proof of an act of civil fraud should require no higher standard.") (cita-
tions omitted); Goodfellow v. Kattnig, 533 P.2d 58, 59 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Rigot v.
Bucci, 245 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 1971) ("We hold that only a preponderance or greater
weight of the evidence is required to establish fraud, whether the action is at law or in
equity."); Ballard's, Inc. v. North Am. Land Dev. Corp., 677 So.2d 648, 651 (La. Ct.
App. 1996) ("Fraud is proved by a preponderance of the evidence ... ."); Humphrey
v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., 500 N.W.2d 788, 791 (Minn. 1993) ("[U]nless otherwise
indicated by the legislature, the standard of proof in all fraud cases is the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard."); Taylor v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 913 P.2d
1242, 1245 (Mont. 1996) ("Fraud can never be presumed but must be proved by a
[VOL. 75:41412
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government procurement system.'8 The elements and standards of
civil fraud evolved at a time when the doctrine of caveat emptor domi-
nated the legal landscape. 14 The circumstances in which the present
government purchasing system exists bear little resemblance to the
environment in which the law of civil fraud was created.15 Thus, this
Article will argue that a legal regime designed to fight fraud in private
commercial transactions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
should not be the model for a statute designed to prevent fraud com-
mitted against the government in the twenty-first century. The Article
will argue that much data suggests that the effects of the 1986 amend-
preponderance of the evidence."); Huffmnan v. Poore, 569 N.W.2d 549, 559 (Neb. Ct.
App. 1997) ("Courts of law require proof of fraud by a preponderance of the evi-
dence .... Since this is an action at law, Huffman must prove fraudulent misrepre-
sentation by a preponderance of the evidence.") (citations omitted); Citizens Nat'l
Bank v. Kennedy & Coe, 441 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Neb. 1989) ("The correct standard of
proof in an action for fraud tried to a court of law is proof by a preponderance, or
greater weight, of the evidence."); Domo v. Stouffer, 580 N.E.2d 788, 792 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1989) ("[Imn an ordinary action at law for money owing based upon fraud, a
preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to prove such fraud."); Ostalkiewicz v.
Guardian Alarm, 520 A.2d 563, 569 (R.I. 1987) ("[F]raud in a civil suit need only be
proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence."); Flockhart v. Wyant, 467 N.W.2d
473, 477 n.6 (S.D. 1991) ("[I]n South Dakota, only a preponderance of the evidence
is required to prove fraud.").
13 "The commercial and defense environments created different incentives and
elicited different behaviors from the people managing the programs. Specific prac-
tices took root and were sustained because they helped a program succeed in its envi-
ronment...." NAT'L SEC. & INT'L AFF. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACcr. OFF., GAO/NSIAD-98-
56, BEST PRACTICES: SUCCESSFUL APPLICATION TO WEAPON AcQUISMONs REQUIRES
CHANGES IN DOD's ENVIRONMENT 5 (1998). A copy of this report is available at
<http://vvw.f-as.org/man/gao/nsiad98056.htm>.
One of the major differences between the civilian sector and the military pro-
curement sector is the tendency of military program budgeters to overestimate the
future availability of budget money and dramatically underestimate the future costs of
the program. See NAT'L SEC. & INT'L AFF. DIV., U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., GAO/T-NSIAD-
97-103, DEFENSE AIRCRAFT INVESTMENTS: MAJOR PROGRAM CoMrIrMENTS BASED ON OP-
TrMSTIC BUDGET PROJECTIONS (1997), available in <http://www.fas.org/man/gao/
ns97103.htn>.
14 The ideal of caveat emptor has not always been the dominant force in the history
of business relatedjurisprudence. See Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat
Emptor, 40 YALE LJ. 1133, 1136 (1931) (stating that "[ c]aveat emptoris not to be found
among the reputable ideas of the middle ages"); Courtney C. Genco, Note, What Ever
Happened to Durland?: Mail Fraud, RICO, and Justifiable Reliance, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
333 (1992).
15 See CARLO M. CrPPoLA, BEFOR THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: EUROPEAN Soca-
, AND ECONOMY, 1000-1700 (2d ed. 1980), for an in-depth look at government in-
tervention in the economy prior to the industrial revolution.
2000] 1413
1414 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:4
ments and the amendments' ultimate ramifications for American tax-
payers are beneficial as opposed to injurious as the critics conclude.
To begin, this Article will define some terms that will be used with
frequency hereinafter. The "government procurement system" is the
sum of all government procurement transactions. A "government
procurement transaction" is a transaction in which an agent for the
Government-for example, executive departments such as the De-
partment of Defense (DOD) or an administrative agency such as the
Medicare Administration-contracts to procure goods or services
from a private commercial firm, or "private commercial contractor."
This Article will argue that the historical development of civil
fraud law in equity courts must be understood in its proper context.
Most pertinent here, the equity courts' development of the "clear and
convincing evidence" burden of proof standard for civil fraud cases
was not the product of judicial wisdom attempting to address some
peculiar nature of civil fraud matters. Rather, it was the product of
the peculiar relationship between common law courts of law and
courts of equity.16 Specifically, the "clear and convincing" burden of
16 Unlike courts of law, which provided only money damages, courts of equity
had a variety of methods for providing relief to plaintiffs.
[1] t is impossible to overlook the fact that the consequences of a wrong deci-
sion may be more serious in [equity courts], because of the nature of the
weapon employed. Under a wide variety of situations, therefore, one who
invokes against another any one or more of a broad group of powerful reme-
dial agencies-e.g., injunction, receivership, specific performance, reforma-
tion, cancellation-must satisfy the court that the facts warrant the relief
sought, by a standard of proof somewhat higher than is required in an issue
where damages alone are at stake. The most frequent are "clear and con-
vincing," "plenary," "unequivocal," "clear, precise and indubitable," "satisfac-
tory," "irrefragable," "clear and decisive."
I FRED F. LAWRENCE, EQUrrv JURISPRUDENcE 78 (1929). These two reasons, forum-
shopping and the differences in available remedies, were proposed by equity judges
and academics as the "ostensible" reasons for imposing a higher standard of proof on
civil fraud litigants in courts of equity, and subsequently in courts of law. The eco-
nomic and societal forces of early America may point to another reason for why the
courts decided to exact this higher standard for litigants: protection of entrepreneur
capitalists to facilitate capital accumulation and allow for increased investment in
plant and equipment leading up to and during the industrial revolution in this coun-
try. See generally MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860 (1977) [hereinafter HOROWITz, 1780-1860].
During the eighty years after the American Revolution, a major transfor-
mation of the legal system took place, which reflected a variety of aspects of
social struggle. That the conflict was turned into legal channels (and thus
rendered somewhat mysterious) should not obscure the fact that it took
place and enabled emergent entrepreneurial and commercial groups to win
a disproportionate share of wealth and power in American society.
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proof standard was the product of equity judges accounting for the
differences in actionable civil fraud claims and more lax evidentiary
rules of their courts vis-a-vis the law courts. Equityjudges feared litig-
ious plaintiffs using their courts as an alternative forum in which to
pursue fraud claims that their brethren in the law courts would not
hear.
In the United States, jurisdictions merged the courts of law and
equity, so that what constituted grounds for an actionable claim (and
the evidentiary rules) would be identical regardless of the remedy the
plaintiff sought. While some courts maintained, and still maintain,
the old equity courts' burden of proof standard for civil fraud cases,
the original justification for the standard has been vitiated. Thus, crit-
ics of the FCA who argue that the "clear and convincing" burden of
proof standard is more appropriate for the matters with which the
statute deals and support their position by pointing to the "wisdom" of
common law judges regarding civil fraud are standing on shaky
ground.
Similarly, critics of the FCA who argue that the government pro-
curement system should be governed by a legal regime similar to that
governing private commercial transactions so that the Government
can "do business" like private firms stand on equally shaky ground. In
government procurement transactions, the incentives that motivate
The transformed character of legal regulation thus became a major in-
strument in the hands of these newly powerful groups. While they often
used the rhetoric of promotion of the public interest-and what self-inter-
ested group does not?--one ought to remain skeptical about their claims.
[I]f we look at the resulting distribution of economic wealth and
power-at the legal expropriation of wealth or at the forced subsidies to
growth coerced from the victims of the process-it is difficult to characterize
it as codifying some consensus on the objective needs of the society.
Id. at xvi. One example of this is the limiting of the application of strict liability by
American courts after the English courts decided Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App.
330 (H.L. 1968). "Under strict liability, enterprises, especially railroads, would be
held liable for all injuries regardless of fault. Manyjurists, including Holmes, devoted
themselves to marginalizing this feared authority for redistribution in torts." MORTON
J. HoRowrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION oFAMERicAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 13 (1992) [here-
inafter HoRowrrz, 1870-1960]; see also Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revi-
talization of Hazardous Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.G. L. REv. 257, 260-74 (1987) (giving
a brief history of strict liability and discussing how the "American courts initially re-
acted negatively" to the Rylands decision). This idea of limiting business's exposure
to liability is also reflected in what Prosser affectionately tiled "[t]he three wicked
sisters of the common law-contributory negligence, assumption of the risk and the
fellow servant rule." WILIM L. PROSSER, THE LA.W O TORTS 383 (2d ed. 1955).
These defenses effectively allowed entrepreneurs and business owners to avoid liabil-
ity in all but the most egregious violations of a duty of care.
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the government's participant or agent differ greatly from the incen-
tives that motivate the private participant. 17 While profit maximiza-
tion clearly is the primary and ultimate incentive operating on the
private participant, various incentives, the least of which is profit max-
imization, motivate the government participant.' 8 Instead, because of
17 According to Todd Sandier and Keith Hartley,
In private firms, incentives to operate efficiently and to substitute relatively
cheaper for more expensive factor inputs are provided by the profit motive
and competition. Such incentives are absent in the military "firm." Instead,
the military sector is a good example of a command economy, operating in a
world without markets. In such a world, individuals and groups of military
personnel are unlikely to minimize costs unless there are strong pressures
for them to do so. Opportunism, bounded rationality, uncertainty, and in-
formation asymmetries provide the circumstances for "shirking" and X-effi-
cient outcomes.
TODD SANDLER & KEITH HARTLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE 175 (1995).
18 Recent events reflect the tension between the profit motive of defense contrac-
tors, the national defense motive of the government, and the re-election motive of
elected officials. The United States (read: Lockheed Martin) is about to sell "[t]he
hottest jet fighter in the world," the F-16 Fighting Falcon, to the United Arab Emir-
ates. Bruce B. Auster, Is the Right Stuff in the Wrong Hands?: A Sheik Gets an OK for Top-
Right F-16s, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 1, 1999, at 16.
Not long ago, the United States did not sell aircraft more advanced than
its own, even to allies. The fear was that friends could turn into foes, as did
Iran in 1979, or that supersecret technology could be captured by Iraq or
Iran. But, pressed by warplane makers who have seen their U.S. market dry
up, the Clinton administration has relaxed many of the old rules.
Normally, the Pentagon would be expected to resist export of a plane
this good. Indeed, when Boeing applied to sell similarly equipped F-15s to
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and elsewhere, the United States denied the sale. But
despite internal protests, top Defense Department officials approved the F-
16 sale .... Why this happened is not entirely clear. Some say the sale may
be a trade to ensure U.S. access to bases in the UAE. Others believe the Air
Force wants to keep Lockheed Martin's F-16 production lines open for the
next generation fighter.
Clearly, industry considerations played a role: The UAE was eyeing a
competing jet being marketed by France, and Vice President Al Gore, in
announcing the deal, projected that 30,000 workers nationwide would work
on the project.
1d. The controversy over waivers given to defense contractors is another example of
the tensions between profits, national security, and re-election. Loral Space and Com-
munications Corporation was granted a waiver in 1998 "to launch one of its communi-
cations satellites on a Chinese rocket, even though the Justice Department was
investigating whether the company improperly helped China upgrade its missiles af-
ter an earlier launch carrying one of the firm's satellites crashed." Ronald Brownstein
et al., Red Scare? The Sensational Rhetoric over the China Scandal Obscures a Basic Question:
Is China Friend orFoe? (visited Mar. 26, 2000) <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/
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980608/8chin.htn>; see also Loral's Waiver Request, Text of Correspondence on Waiver to
Permit Satellite Export (visited Mar. 26, 2000) <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/in-
trel/satwave.htm>.
Congress had prohibited launches in China in response to the Tiananmen Massa-
cre, but allowed the President to exempt certain launches from the prohibition based
on "national interest." See Brownstein et al., supra. "American companies
have ... turned to China for launches because it offers cheaper rates." I. In appar-
ent support of the commercial interests of defense contractors, "Clinton ... moved
responsibility for the export of commercial satellites from the State Department to
the Commerce Department and granted Loral one waiver." I& After the waiver was
granted, Congress discovered a "classified Pentagon report from May 1997... [that]
concluded that scientists from Loral and Hughes 'turned over expertise that signifi-
cantly improved the reliability of China's nuclear missiles' at a risk to U.S. national
security interests." Clinton Welcomes China Satellite Probe (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://
ww.usatoday.com/news/index/finance/ncfin275.htm>. It was later revealed that
"Loral CEO Schwartz gave $632,000 in 'soft money' in the 1995-96 presidential elec-
tion cycle and an additional $421,000 in the [1998] one." Id. Responsibility for the
approval of such waivers has recently been transferred back to the State Department.
SeeEric Pooley, RedFace over China, TIME,June 1, 1998, at 46, 47-48. "[A]fter Clinton
was elected President, he [like President Bush before him] came under the same
pressures from business leaders, who argued that export controls endangered Ameri-
can telecommunications primacy." Id at 47-48. A recent decision by the U.S. to
deny a $450 million Hughes satellite deal with China seems to symbolize the different
attitude of the State Department to such deals. See US Nixes China Satellite Deal (visited
Feb. 10, 1999) <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/tech/DailyNews/chinasats990223.
html>. "The Commerce Department had favored approving the license but the State
and Defense departments feared the sale would put U.S. security at risk due to the
potential for transfer of sensitive launch information that could ultimately be used in
China's missile program." Id
The conflict between profits and national security is evident in the attempts of
industry groups to lobby for lighter export controls on technology. "Industry groups
plan to lobby Congress this spring to allow more powerful [computers] to be ex-
ported, arguing that the 1995 limits are already outdated. The Cox report [a report
by a panel by Congressman Chris Cox of California], calls for greater scrutiny ....
There are 'two trains rushing down the track directly at each other on this,' an admin-
istration official said." Warren P. Strobel & Douglas Pasternak, By Hook or By Crook:
China Grabs U.S. Technology to Modernize Military, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 8,
1999, at 34.
This tension between corporate profits and national security is particularly evi-
dent in the area of offset agreements in defense contracts between U.S. defense con-
tractors and foreign governments. Offsets are "the entire range of industrial and
commercial compensation practices provided to foreign governments and firms as
inducements or conditions for the purchase of military goods and services. They in-
clude co-production, technology transfers, training, investment, marketing assistance,
and commodity trading." NAT'L SEC. & INT'L Arr. Div., U.S. GEN. ACCr. OFF., PUB.
No. GAO/NSIAD-96-65, MILITARY ExPoRTs: OFFsET DEMANDS CoNTINUE TO GROW 1
(1996).
The monetary amount of these offsets is no small figure. "Since the mid-80s,
government figures show that U.S. companies have entered into offset agreements
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valued at over $84 billion." Id. Offsets were of such a concern to Congress that Con-
gress enacted the Feingold Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act, prohibiting
contractors from "making incentive payments to a U.S. company or individual to in-
duce or persuade them to buy goods or services from a foreign country that has an
offset agreement with the contractor." NAT'L SEC. & INT'L AFF. Div., U.S. GEN. Acor.
OFF., GAO/NSIAD-97-189, MILITARY OFFSETS-REGULATIONS NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT
PROHIBITION ON INCENTIVE PAYMENTS 2 (1997); see also 22 U.S.C. §§ 2761, 2762,
2779(a) (1994).
Two relatively recent offset cases, the FS-X project and the F/A-18 sale to Malay-
sia, demonstrate the conflict between corporate profits on the one hand and national
security and national economic interests on the other. In the late 1980s, General
Dynamics (now Lockheed) got into a cooperative agreement to produce the FS-X, an
advanced fighter aircraft modeled on the F-16 Fighting Falcon. After initial approval
of the project by the Reagan Administration, the project began to come under serious
attack by Congress during the Bush Administration. See Center for Sec. Pol'y, The
U.S.-Japan FS-X Fighter Agreement: Assessing the Stakes (visited Feb. 22, 1999) <http://
www.security-policy.org/papers/1989/89-12.html>. Congressional critics worried that
the technology transfers required under the offset portions of the contract would
allow the Japanese to build a foundation for competing with the U.S. commercial and
military aviation industries. See Conflicting U.S. Objectives in Weapon System Codevelop-
ment: The FS-X Case (visited Mar. 28, 1999) <http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/
RB20.html>.
The project will go ahead, but on drastically different terms than originally
agreed upon. See id. "Perhaps the most important lesson of the FS-X is that the U.S.
government needs to formulate and implement a single, coordinated policy on
weapon system procurement collaboration that harmonizes U.S. military and eco-
nomic objectives." Id. at 2. For a detailed analysis of the problems and technology
transfers associated with the FS-X deal, see NAT'L SEC. & INT'L AFF. DIV., U.S. GEN.
Accr. OFF., GAO/NSIAD-95-145, U.S.-JAPAN COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT: PROGRESS
ON FS-X PROGRAM ENHANCES JAPANESE AEROSPACE CAPABILrIES (1995). See also
<http://www.fas.org/man/gao/gao95145.htm> for a copy of the same report. The
F/A-18 sale to Malaysia shows how defense contractors can promote the idea ofjobs at
home to facilitate the sale of weapons abroad.
Take the case of Malaysia, which just completed a deal for eight sophisti-
cated jet fighters made by McDonnell Douglas Corp. In December 1992,
while returning to Kuala Lumpur after a tour of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty
Hawk, Defense Minister Datuk Mohamed Najib Abdul Razak told U.S. Am-
bassador John Wolf that the Southeast Asian nation would order $660 mil-
lion of Russian MiG-29R fighters. Malaysia would have bought American, he
explained, but "you probably wouldn't be prepared to release your high-tech
aircraft."
Alerted by the ambassador, top U.S. government and corporate officials
sprang into action. And in a mater of months they persuaded Malaysia to
augment the Russian purchase with the F/A-18 attack jets.
[T]he drift of U.S. arms-export policy, as domestic economic concerns
take precedence over geo-political goals, is raising questions about the risks
of proliferation. While keeping U.S. industry strong aids the nation's secur-
ity, providing top-tier weapons to contentious neighbors in the world's hot
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the nature of the government procurement system, other diverse
motivations move government agents, such as the public interest,
political considerations, securing budgetary appropriations, inter-or-
ganization rivalries, career advancement within the Government, and
potential career advancement with their private sector counterparts.
This asymmetry in profit maximization's role as an incentive in
the government procurement system has several effects, all of which
are deleterious to the government's effort to deter fraud. In a purely
private commercial transaction where profit motivates both partici-
pants, each agent monitors the other's goods, services, and billing
practices as if their respective jobs depended on it. Clearly, theirjobs
do depend on it; a business that loses money is generally forced to
leave the playing field. By contrast, in the government procurement
system, the government agents, from department secretaries and ad-
ministrative agency heads to their most subordinate contracting
agents, are generally not evaluated on how financially efficient their
programs are. Indeed, because of the nature of the budgetary pro-
cess, one can argue that there is an incentive for government agents
to spend money unnecessarily. It is axiomatic that in such a system
the government participant will not monitor the goods, services, and
billing practices of their private commercial counterparts with the
same vigilance that private commercial contractors monitor one
another.
The second related consequence is that in such an environment,
the private commercial contractors have less incentive to develop in-
ternal controls to police the conduct of their own agents. Therefore,
unlike in the private commercial setting where both parties' agents
have incentives to monitor aggressively both one another and them-
selves, in the government procurement system, absent government
regulation, significantly less motivation exists on both sides. While
spots could be tantamount to striking matches in a tinderbox. Further, the
U.S. sales push is stirring competitive vigor within Russia and Europe, in-
creasing chances of regional destabilization.
Even some U.S. defense-company executives worry that global-security
considerations are getting short shrift because arms-exporting countries are
so pressed to protect jobs and their industrial base. "I think the world as a
whole is perilously close to that line," says Norman Augustine, chairman of
Martin Marietta Corp., a leading arms exporter.
Jeff Cole & Sarah Luberman, Weapons Merchants Are Going Great Guns in Post-Cold War
Era, (visited Mar. 28, 1999) <http://ww.infomanage.com/nonproliforation/conven-
tional/deathmerchants.html>. For deeper discussions of the political and military in-
centives at work in the purchase of weapons, see infra Part IV.1-2.
2000] 1419
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
critics of the FCA argue that the government, and ultimately taxpay-
ers, would benefit if the laws regarding government procurement
transactions were like those regarding private commercial transac-
tions, they overlook the distinction between the two kinds of
transactions.
Both the critics and some advocates of the FCA also misconstrue
the effects of the 1986 amendments on the government procurement
system. This Article will discuss the key provisions of the amendments
below, but the amendments generally accomplished the following:
(1) Increased the penalty and damages provisions of the FCA;
(2) Increased incentives for private parties to bring qui tam actions
on behalf of the government;
(3) Broadened the statute's definition of "knowingly," so that the
state of mind required for liability includes "deliberate igno-
rance" and "reckless disregard" for the truth, and eliminated
the need to prove specific intent; and
(4) Clarified that the applicable burden of proof standard is "pre-
ponderance of the evidence," and resolved some confusion in
the Circuit Courts.
Advocates of the amendments accurately relate that these
changes increase the disincentives for contractors to commit fraud or
file false claims for payment from the government by increasing the
likelihood that such conduct will result in liability and increasing the
potential breadth of such liability. Advocates also correctly argue that
the amendments increase the incentives for private commercial con-
tractors to monitor their own conduct and strengthen internal con-
trols in an attempt to reduce the potential for FCA liability. Thus, the
advocates argue that the amendments benefit the government, and
ultimately taxpayers, by increasing the probability that malfeasants will
recompense the government for their ill-gotten gains (i.e., with treble
damages and penalties) and by decreasing the likelihood that private
commercial contractors will either knowingly or recklessly submit false
claims to the government.
The critics of the amended FCA have seized upon that which the
advocates tend not to discuss. The critics rightly point out that costs
born by the government, and ultimately by taxpayers, accompany the.
benefits discussed above. Critics correctly argue that the private com-
mercial contractors will account for the increased risk of liability and
increased cost of internal controls and regulatory compliance by in-
creasing the price of the goods and services they offer in government
procurement transactions. Also, some private commercial contractors
will decide to limit or eliminate their contracts with the government
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because of the increased costs associated with government procure-
ment transactions. This latter phenomenon will result in an increase
in the prices that the government pays for services as competition de-
creases among private commercial contractors due to fewer contrac-
tors. Basic economics and marginal analysis indicates that this is so.
As a result, the government will pay higher prices for goods and serv-
ices because of the increased supplier costs and reduced competition
that the amendments create.
While the observations that both the advocates and the critics of
the FCA make are correct, the inquiry cannot stop there. This Article
suggests an answer to the question that both the advocates and critics
of the amended FCA do not address: whether the total financial costs
or total benefits of the amendments are greater. Due to the FCA
amendments, does the government successfully prosecute, recover,
and deter enough fraud so that the money saved is greater than the
increase in prices that the government will pay for the goods and serv-
ices it must procure? This Article offers data that suggest that the ben-
efits do outweigh the costs and that the 1986 amendments to the FCA
promote the financial welfare of the government, and ultimately tax-
payers. This conclusion is based on the following:
(1) A factual analysis of the nature of the government procurement
system, which indicates that government procurement transac-
tions are entirely unlike private commercial transactions re-
garding the incentives at work on the respective participants;
(2) Data that suggest that the increase in the amount of fraud the
amendments allow the government to recover against and de-
ter is great; and
(3) Data that suggest that, after an initial decline, the number of
private commercial defense contractors willing to do business
and actively contracting with the government has not decreased
but increased during an era of consolidation among large pri-
vate commercial contractors and relatively static overall budget
growth.
From this evidence, which this Article will detail below, it follows
that the government procurement system is a peculiar arrangement
completely unlike the private commercial sector. Thus, the legal re-
gime for which critics of the FCA argue, which is tailored to make
whole a private sector civil fraud plaintiff, simply will not suffice to
ensure the government is not robbed blind. Also, the mass exodus of
private commercial contractors desiring to contract with the govern-
ment about which the critics of the FCA complain is simply not repre-
sented in the data. Rather, despite the increased costs of doing
20o
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business with the government because of the FCA amendments, firms
are competing for government contracts. Finally, while the current
FCA and its enforcement is not flawless, the government has already
recovered, will recover, has deterred, and will likely deter more fraud
and false claims than with the pre-1986 FCA.
To relate the above argument, this Article will assume the follow-
ing format. In Part I, this Article will briefly describe the creation of
the FCA in its Civil War context and the subsequent amendments to
the FCA in their respective contexts. Part I will conclude by describ-
ing in greater detail the 1986 amendments to the FCA.
Part II of this Article will then offer a brief history of the develop-
ment of civil fraud law. Initially, Part II will describe what the phrase
"burden of proof' means and how the burden of proof functions in
allocating evidentiary requirements between plaintiff and defendant.
Next, it will explain in greater detail the relationship between the
courts of law and the courts of equity, and why equity judges created
and applied the "clear and convincing" burden of proof standard to
civil fraud cases.
Part III will show that not all states have adopted the "clear and
convincing" burden of proof standard for civil fraud, that many states
are following the federal government's lead by creating FCA-like stat-
utes with a "preponderance" standard, and that the federal courts
have used the "clear and convincing" standard sparingly while apply-
ing the "preponderance" standard to a variety of fraud-style actions.
Against this backdrop of the development of civil fraud law, Part
IV will factually analyze the nature of the government procurement
system as it existed in 1986 and as it still exists today. It is in this
context of the contemporary government procurement system gener-
ally, and the defense procurement system specifically, that the Gov-
ernment must utilize the FCA. First, Part IV will describe the history
of war profiteering and defense fraud in the United States. Part IV
will then describe the basics of the budgetary process, from Congress
to the executive departments and administrative agencies. It will also
describe the concept of regulatory capture and the unique relation-
ships among branches of the armed services and between members of
the branches and their private commercial contractor counterparts.
This Part will characterize some of the various and sundry incentives
that motivate government participants in government procurement
transactions and document actual examples of the unfortunate conse-
quences that can result from a poorly policed government procure-
ment system.
After briefly explaining an economic model for deterrence and
the concept of optimal deterrence, Part V will describe in economic
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terms some of the effects that the 1986 amendments will cause and
why these effects occur. Part V lays out in economic terms the con-
cept of optimal efficiency and its relationship to optimal deterrence.
This Part will then show the data supporting the conclusions sug-
gested above and will argue that, while one cannot perform the ideal
study of optimal efficiency in this context because too many variables
cannot be quantified, the data suggest that the 1986 amendments
move our public fisc towards, rather than away from, optimal
efficiency.
In Part VI, the Article concludes by summarizing the history be-
hind the burden of proof standard, the reason the FCA. was amended
in 1986, and why those amendments were proper under the incentive
system that surrounds the government contracting arena in 1986 and
the present.
I. A ISTORY OF lE FALSE CaAIms AcT
Congress created the FCA in 186319 to combat perceived "wide-
spread procurement fraud in Civil War defense contracts."20 The in-
credible surge in war spending during this period, coupled with a lack
of sufficient federal enforcement organizations, 21 created the impetus
for Congress to legislate the Act in an effort to curb the "widely-publi-
cized abuses by unscrupulous private contractors."22 As originally writ-
ten, the Act provided both civil and criminal penalties for fraudulent
and false claims submitted to the United States for payment.2 3 In
1874, the Act was re-codified and the civil sanctions were placed in
one section of the code while the criminal provisions were placed in a
different section.
The Act was specifically designed to combat fraud and false
claims by essentially "deputizing" private citizens and giving them the
19 False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, 696-98 (1863) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994) and 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (1994)).
20 Sharon A. Jenks & Brian Kaplan, False Claims, 34 Am. GRIM. L. REv. 555, 555
(1997); see also S. REP. No. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.SG..A.N. 5266,
5273 ("The False Claims Act was adopted in 1863 and signed into law by President
Abraham Lincoln in order to combat rampant fraud in Civil War Contracts."); JoN
T. BozsE, CVnL FALSE CLaims AND Qui TAM ACTIONS 1-5 to 1-6 (Supp 1999).
21 SeeJames B. HelmerJr. & Robert Clark NeffJr., War Stories: A History of the Qui
Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and
Their Application in United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 35, 35 (1991); see also BOESE, supra note 20, at 1-6.
22 BoEsE, supra note 20, at 1-6.
23 See False Claims Act § 6, 12 Stat. at 698. Although ultimately dropped from the
law, the initial bill included a provision that subjected contractors accused of fraud or
false claims not to trial but military court-marshal. See BOESE, supra note 20, at 1-8.
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right to file a civil action against any person who submitted a false or
fraudulent claim for payment to the United States government.
24
This qui tam provision allowed the private citizen to collect up to fifty
percent of all monies recovered in the lawsuit.25 The qui tam portion
of the statute served an important role in the enforcement of the Act.
At the time of the statute's enactment, the federal government had no
investigative or prosecutorial bodies, other than Postal Inspectors, to
ferret out fraud. Given the long history of the use of qui tam provi-
sions in this country,26 such a provision in the Act seemed perfect to
augment the government's ability to police fraud and profiteering
during the war. In order to recompense the government for losses
due to fraud, the Act provided for the collection of double damages
and a $2000 penalty for each false claim made by a contractor.
27
Although the language of the Act and its legislative history emphasize
fraud and false claims in military procurement, the statute was appli-
cable to all government claimants. 28
Prior to 1930, there were very few decisions in the federal courts
involving the civil provisions of the FCA. 29 United States v. G2riswald"° is
the most renowned early case. In its decision, the Griswald court
noted the following:
The statute is a remedial one. It is intended to protect the
Treasury against the hungry and unscrupulous host that encom-
passes it on every side, and should be construed accordingly. It was
passed on the theory... that one of the least expensive and most
24 See 132 CONG. REc. H6428 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Berman).
25 See False Claims Act § 6, 12 Stat. at 698. The term qui tam is an abbreviation for
the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro seipso," which translates to "he who
as much for the king as for himself." BOESE, supra note 20, at 1-7. For a complete
history and analysis of qui tam actions, see Note, The History and Development of Qui
Tam, WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 83 (1972) (citing 3 WILLIAM BLAcKSotNE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF ENGLAND 160 (1st ed. 1768)); see also BOESE, supra note 20, at 1-5 to 1-10.
26 See generally supra note 27 (discussing the history of qui tam in this country).
27 See False Claims Act § 3, 12 Stat. at 698.
28 See §§ 2-3, 12 Stat. at 698.
29 Cf BOESE, supra note 20, at 1-10. Most of the early cases deal with actions
brought under the military court martial or criminal provisions in the Act. See United
States v. Kapp, 302 U.S. 214 (1937); Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902); Edg-
ington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361 (1896); Kurzrok v. United States, 1 F.2d 209 (8th
Cir. 1924); United States ex rel. Viscardi v. MacDonald, 265 F. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1920);
United States ex rel. Williams v. Barry, 260 F. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); Ex parte Henderson,
11 F. Cas. 1067 (C.C.D. Ky. 1878) (No. 6349); United States v.Jennison, 26 F. Cas. 608
(C.C.D. Kan. 1874) (No. 15,475); In re Bogart, 3 F. Cas. 796 (C.C.D. Cal. 1873) (No.
1596).
30 24 F. 361 (D. Or. 1885), affd, 30 F. 762 (C.C.D. Or. 1887).
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effective means of preventing fraud on the Treasury is to make the
perpetrators of them liable to actions by private persons act-
ing ... under strong stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of
gain.
3 1
The Griswald court recognized that the qui tam provision played
an important role in discovering fraud and that government actions
could not void or preempt the vested rights of a citizen plaintiff to the
receipt of damages.
3 2
One problem with the Act as originally written was the ability of
individuals to file civil False Claim suits against contractors based on
information gleaned from criminal indictments filed by the govern-
ment.3 3 United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess3 4 stands out as an excellent
and famous example of this type of "parasitic lawsuit."35 As a result of
this type of civil action under the Act, Congress amended the Act in
December 1943.36 This modification of the FCA specifically stated
31 Id. at 366.
32 See United States v. Griswald, 30 F. 762, 763 (C.C.D. Or. 1887).
33 See Helmer & Neff, supra note 21, at 38.
34 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
35 See generally S. REP. No. 99-345, at 10-12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C-A.N.
5266, 5275-76.
36 Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§ 232-35 (1976)). It seems incredibly short-sighted on the part of Congress and the
President to amend the Act just when war spending was coming to its peak. Just as
during the Civil War, World War I, and the other times of increased defense activity
and government spending on the military, defense contractor fraud during World
War II was rampant. In reaction to the reports of contractor fraud, then-Senator
Harry S. Truman organized the Truman Committee in 1941 to investigate waste,
fraud, and corruption in defense contracts.
The committee uncovered numerous examples of corruption. Empire
Ordnance, a firm started with $42,500 in capital, had employed the Wash-
ington attorney Thomas Corcoran to gain entr6e to defense officials, se-
cured over $47 million in contracts for allied shipping, and then proceeded
to build a shipyard in Savannah so defective that it had to be taken over by
the Maritime Commission. Proving that no bad deed goes unrewarded, Em-
pire eventually extracted a settlement of $1,285,000 for the government
seizure of its shoddy facilities.
HAMBY, supra note 2, at 256-57. For an in-depth look at the workings and findings of
the Truman Committee, see DONALD H. RIDDLE, THE TRUMAN COMrEE: A STuDY IN
CONGRrssIoNAL RFSPoNsmILrIY (1964). The type of situation described above, con-
tractor malfeasance and the contractor's subsequent receipt of money from the gov-
ernment for terminating the problematic program, is still a problem today. In 1998,
the Court of Federal Claims awarded General Dynamics and the Boeing Company
$1.2 billion in damages and an additional $538 million in interest charges based on
the termination of the A-12 contract by the government. See Federal Court Awards $1.2
Billion to General Dynamics and Boeing (visited Feb. 12, 1999) <http://www.
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that prior knowledge of the government concerning the false or
fraudulent claim "was an absolute bar to jurisdiction over qui tam
suits. ' 37 Relators3 8 now had to present all of their evidence to the
government before filing a False Claims civil suit, and the government
had sixty days in which to decide whether to pursue the case.3 9 If the
government decided to prosecute, then the Department of Justice
took over the case, and the relator became nothing more than an in-
terested observer. The 1943 amendments significantly decreased the
rewards possible for a relator, reducing the maximum bounty to no
more than twenty-five percent if the government did not take over the
case, and ten percent if it did.4
0
An equally plausible, and possibly more accurate, explanation for
the actions of Congress in amending the FCA after Hess was the desire
of Congress to reduce any possible impediments to the war effort.
Resistance to the Truman Committee's formation and powers is an
indication of Congress's hesitation to construct any sort of obstacles
that might hamper the war effort. Although there were serious allega-
tions of defense contractor fraud during this period, Congress saw the
Truman Committee as a repetition of the disasterous Committee on
the Conduct of the War created during the Civil War. The Committee
on the Conduct of the War was seen as having little to do with improv-
ing the war effort of the Union Army and everything to do with ad-
vancing the political agendas of its members. 41 In 1943, the time of
the FCA amendment, the nation was losing the war in the Pacific and
nothing was as important as getting back the momentum from the
Japanese. Amending the FCA so that it was more business "friendly"
probably looked like a necessary evil if it meant helping to win the
War. Deterring any business from providing goods for the war effort
was the last thing Congress wanted to do.
42
aerotechnews.com/starc/022398/022498d.html#federal>; The Project on Government
Oversight: Concerns and Questions: The A-12 Aircraft Financial Fiasco (visited Feb. 22,
1999) <http://www.pogo.org/mici/products/a-12.htm>. The government originally
cancelled the program due to cost overruns and schedule delays. No weapons were
ever produced or given to the government despite the expenditure of over three mil-
lion dollars. See id. For further discussion of the A-12 program, see infra Part IV.B.
37 BOESE, supra note 20, at 1-13 (Supp. 1997).
38 This term is used for a qui tam plaintiff.
39 See Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. at 608.
40 See id.
41 See MERLE MILLER, PLAIN SPEAKING: AN ORAL BIOGRAPHY OF HARRY S. TRuMAN
164-65 (1974).
42 This should in no way be interpreted to mean that fraud in government con-
tracting did not go on during World War II in the United States. As the investigations
of the Truman Committee proved, fraud by some defense contractors was rampant
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Due to these changes in the law, coupled with the decisions of
some courts of appeal requiring proof by "clear and convincing" evi-
dence in civil False Claims actions,43 the qui tam provisions of the Act
fell into disuse.44
Congress again was energized to amend the FCA in the wake of
the fraud and false claims allegations made by a defense worker, John
M. Gravitt against General Electric Corporation.45 The incredible up-
surge in government defense spending in the 1980s mirrored the con-
ditions present during the Civil War and World War II eras in which
fraud and false claims by defense contractors were seen as abundant.
The difficulties Mr. Gravitt experienced, both from the government
and the defendant, in attempting to bring the company's fraudulent
practices to light and in his subsequent pursuit of a claim, prompted
Congress to revisit the issue of qui tam suits under the Act. Extensive
hearings were held on the subject of fraud, waste, and "governmental
and it cost many service men their lives. The best example is the investigation of the
Wright Aeronautical Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Curtiss-Wright
Corporation. The Committee found that the company was supplying the Army Air
Corp with substandard aircraft engines and spare parts. During the investigation, the
committee discovered that Army Air Corps officials had created an environment in
which inspectors felt pressured by the military to give passing marks to defective
goods. The discovery of these problems "suggest[s] that Curtiss-Wright was more in-
terested in its own welfare than in its duty in the struggle in which its products were
playing an important part." RIDDLE, supra note 36, at 137. The press criticized the
Committee's findings in this case with venom stating "that the Committee was hurting
production for that its findings were bad for morale and should be kept quiet." Id. at
138. The Justice Department did file a civil suit against the company, but it was never
pursued, and no criminal charges were ever brought against the company. See
HAMBY, supra note 2, at 257.
43 Compare United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1979) (requiring
clear and convincing evidence), United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310, 314 (6th Cir.
1962) (same), United States v. Lawson, 522 F. Supp. 746, 750 (D.NJ. 1981) (same),
United States v. Klein, 230 F. Supp. 426, 433 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (same), Hagney v.
United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 412, 428 (1978) (same), and United States v. Shapleigh, 54
F. 126, 134 (8th Cir. 1893) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt), with Federal
Crop Ins. Corp. v. Hester, 765 F.2d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1985) (requiring a preponder-
ance of the evidence), United States v. Thomas, 717 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1983) (same),
United States v. JT Const. Co., 668 F. Supp. 592, 592-93 (W.D. Tex. 1987) (same),
and Thevenot v. National Flood Ins. Program, 620 F. Supp. 391, 394 (D.C. La. 1985)
(same).
44 See BOESE, supra note 20, at 1-3; Helmer & Neff, supra note 21, at 39-40.
45 For an in-depth discussion of the case, see Helmer & Neff, supra note 21, at
41-44, and see also Gravitt v. General Elec. Co., 680 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ohio. 1988).
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acquiescence" 46 in the area of contracting, the direct results of which
were the 1986 amendments to the FCA. 47
"There is no question that the 1986 amendments were intended
to be a watershed in enforcement and recovery under the Act."48 The
congressional record is replete with testimony and debate that reflect
Congress's dismay at the endemic level of fraud and false claims in
government programs in general and defense programs in particu-
lar.4 9 There was also congressional concern about the diminished de-
terrent effect of the penalties portion of the statute due to inflationary
erosion. 50
The 1986 amendments to the Act addressed both of these issues.
First, the amendments clarified that preponderance of the evidence is
the requisite statutory burden of proof standard for the Act.51 Con-
gress made this change in order to bring the statute in line with the
standard normally applied in civil actions.5 2 Second, under the newly
amended statute, "knowing" and "knowledge" were defined so as to
include not only actual knowledge, but acts of deliberate ignorance
and reckless disregard of the truth.53 The debate contained in the
legislative history of these amendments indicates that Congress
46 BOESE, supra note 20, at 1-17 (Supp. 1994).
47 See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2-3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 5266,
5267-68; see also Hearings on S. 1562 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 49, 53 (1985) (statements of John M.
Gravitt and James B. Helmer, Jr., Esq.); Hearings on False Claims Act Amendments Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 339, 339-392 (1986) (statements ofJohn M. Gravitt andJames B.
Helmer, Jr., Esq.).
48 BOESE, supra note 20, at 1-17 (Supp. 1994).
49 See S. REp. No. 99-345, at 2-3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CAN. 5266,
5267-68. The Department ofJustice estimated that between one and 10% of the Fed-
eral budget was consumed by fraud. See id.
50 In 1863 dollars, $2000 in 1863 dollars would have been the equivalent of
$18,000 in 1986 dollars. See 132 CONG. REc. H6479 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (state-
ment of Rep. Glickman).
51 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (1994) now provides that "[i] n any action brought under
section 3730, the United States shall be required to prove all essential elements of the
cause of action, including damages, by a preponderance of the evidence."
52 "False Claims proceedings are civil and remedial in nature and are brought to
recover compensatory damages." S. RnP. No. 99-345, at 30-31 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5296.
53 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (b) (1994). "Congress intentionally fell short of imposing
liability for mere negligence." BOESE, supra note 20, at 1-19 (Supp. 1994); see also 132
CONG. REc. H9389 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986) (remarks of Rep. Berman). In essence, the
statute requires a level of knowledge that eliminates the chance of a person being
subject to an FCA action due to a mistake or mere negligence. The Act is intended to
promote the idea that persons getting paid by the government should put forth some
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adopted the idea "that individuals and contractors receiving public
funds have some duty to make a limited inquiry so as to be reasonably
certain they are entitled to the money they seek."54 Third, the
amended Act afforded the plaintiff "three times the amount of dam-
ages which the government sustains because of the act of that per-
son"55 and allows the government to collect a "civil penalty of not less
than five thousand and not more than $10,000"56 for each act.
A. Liability Under the False Claims Act
Although, "the False Claims Act was not designed to reach every
kind of fraud practiced on the government,"5 7 the 1986 amendments
do extend the reach of the FCA with regard to various types of fraud
committed against the United States. Section 3729(a) of the FCA
broadly defines seven different forms of activity that constitute viola-
tions under the FCA. 58 Each one of these seven violations contains
effort to ensure that the money or goods they are receiving from the government
under a contract have actually been earned.
54 S. REP. No. 99-345, at 20 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CAN. 5266, 5285.
This portion of the Amendment eliminated a split in the circuits over whether the
statute required specific intent to defraud. Compare United States v. Hughes, 585 F.2d
284, 286-88 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating no specific intent required), with United States v.
Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 122-23 (9th Cir. 1970) (requiring specific intent to defraud).
55 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (1994).
56 Id.
57 United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958).
58 A defendant is liable to the government, under the FGA, if the defendant does
any one of the following:
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee
of the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of
the United States government a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the
Government;
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent
claim allowed or paid;
(4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be
used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government,
makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the infor-
mation on the receipt is true;
(5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property
used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the
Government, makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing
that the information on the receipt is true;
(6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public
property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a member
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various elements that must be proved in order for the plaintiff to sus-
tain a cause of action and prevail against a defendant.59 These various
violations under the FCA do, however, contain certain common lan-
guage, and the way in which courts have interpreted this language has
created a variety of contours in the law's application.
1. What Constitutes a "Claim" Under the FCA?
In rejecting the restricted definition given to the word "claim" by
various courts, 60 Congress defined the term in the 1986 amendments
and expanded its meaning. A "claim" now includes any request or
demand for money or property, either through a contract or other
device, as long as some amount of the money or property demanded
will be provided or reimbursed by the United States Government.
Consistent with this expanded definition of the word "claim,"
courts have found that the term encompasses progress reports and
vouchers, false presentations of compliance with various environmen-
tal regulations in a government contract, and redemption of illegally
obtained food stamps. In certain instances, courts have held that a
defendant who retains money paid him by mistake has made a "claim"
under the FCA. A bid for a contract, however, is not a "claim" covered
by the FCA, and the FCA explicitly excludes any claims made under
the Internal Revenue Code.
2. Defining "False or Fraudulent" Under the FCA
Since the FCA does not specifically define the terms "false" or
"fraudulent," courts have defined the terms through 'Judicial inter-
pretation and construction." 61 Although in most cases there is little
of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge the property;
or
(7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the Government.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
59 For an excellent discussion of how the courts define the requisite elements of
each violation provided for in the FCA, see BOESE, supra note 20, at 2-6 to 2-31 (Supp.
1995).
60 See United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595 (1958) (restricting the meaning of
the word "claim" under the FCA); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,
reh'g denied, 318 U.S. 799 (1943) (stating that a "claim" under the Act means a de-
mand for money or property); United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339 (1926) (finding
the FCA inapplicable because no money or property claim was asserted against the
government).
61 BOESE, supra note 20, at 2-45 (Supp. 1995).
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doubt as to whether or not a claim is false, cases involving the "inter-
pretation of government regulations,"62 contracts, or other instru-
ments often present vexing problems as to what is "false." In many of
these cases, contractors have successfully defeated Government allega-
tions of falsity by showing that their reading of a statute or regulation
was reasonable even if not correct.63 Thus, in determining falsity,
courts appear to use an objective determination standard.
3. The Meaning of "Knowingly" Under the FCA
Prior to the 1986 amendments, the circuit courts were split as to
whether the word "knowingly ' required proof of specific intent to de-
fraud. 64 Some courts held that since the FCA was aimed at criminal-
type conduct, the government was required to prove that the defend-
ant specifically intended to defraud the government.65 Other courts
held that the government need only prove that the defendant had
actual knowledge that the claim was false to satisfy the knowledge ele-
ment.66 Finally, a third group of court decisions viewed the FCA as a
civil statute in nature, and thus concluded that, "extremely careless
and foolish acts amounted to a 'knowing' violation of the Act."
67
The 1986 amendments resolved this dispute between the circuits
in no uncertain terms. The FCA provides in relevant part,
(b) Knowing and Knowingly Defined.-For purposes of this sec-
tion, the terms "knowing" and "knowingly" mean that a person,
with respect to information-
(1) has actual knowiedge of the information;
(2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information; or
(3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the infor-
mation, and no proof of specific intent to defraud is
required.68
62 Id. at 2-45 to -46 (Supp. 1995).
63 See United States v. Race, 632 F.2d 1114 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. An-
derson, 579 F.2d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5, 11
(D.D.C. 1994); United States v. Napco Int'l, 835 F. Supp. 493 (D. Minn. 1993).
64 The decisions of various courts basically breaks "down into three groups."
BoEsE, supra note 20, at 2-66 (Supp. 1995).
65 See United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 121 (9th Cir. 1970).
66 See United States v. Hughes, 585 F.2d 284, 286-88 (7th Cir. 1978) (requiring
no specific intent); Fleming v. United States, 336 F.2d 475 (10th Cir. 1964).
67 BoEsE, supra note 20, at 2-67 (Supp. 1995); see also United States v. Cooperative
Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1973).
68 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (1994).
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In adding this sub-section to the FCA, Congress was determined
"to reach what has become known as the 'ostrich' type situation where
an individual 'buried his head in the sand' and failed to make simple
inquiries which would alert him that false claims were being submit-
ted."69 In amending the FCA, Congress made an explicit determina-
tion that those who obtain funds from the government have a duty to
inquire as to whether or not their claim is accurate in all respects.
70
4. Burden of Proof
As with the meaning of "knowingly," circuit courts also split as to
the correct standard for the burden of proof for the FCA. Despite the
fact that the Act was conspicuously civil, the decision of courts as to
this aspect of the FCA ranged from a "preponderance" standard all
the way to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.71 The 1986
amendments did away with this uncertainty. The FCA specifically
states that "[i]n any action brought under Section 3730, the United
States shall be required to prove all essential elements of the cause of
action, including damages, by a preponderance of the evidence." 72 In
providing for this standard in the FCA, Congress determined that FCA
litigation is civil and remedial, and therefore, a higher standard is
inappropriate.
II. FALSE CLAIMS Acr AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF: PREPONDERANCE
OF THE EVIDENCE
Opponents of the present burden of proof standard for the Act
state that "[t]here is no obvious reason for loosening the proof re-
quirements that apply in purely commercial settings simply because
the Government... is the plaintiff."73 The basis for this argument is
the assumption that (a) " [t] he standard of proof necessary to win a
judgment should reflect the relative risk to the parties of an incorrect
outcome, "74 and (b) the interactions between contractors and the gov-
ernment are analogous to those of private sector commercial entities.
69 S. REP. No. 99-345, at 20-21 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5286.
See supra Part II for a discussion of the Gravitt case.
70 See BOESE, supra note 20, at 1-19 (Supp. 1994).
71 See Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Hester, 765 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1985) (preponder-
ance of the evidence); United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1962) (clear and
convincing); United States v. Shapliegh, 54 F. 126 (8th Cir. 1883) (beyond a reason-
able doubt); Hageny v. United States, 570 F.2d 924 (Cl. Ct. 1978) (clear and
convincing).
72 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (1994).
73 An Obstacle, supra note 4, at 25.
74 Id. at 1.
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Would-be reformers then reason that elements of the Act, like civil
fraud suits in many jurisdictions, should require a plaintiff to prove
fraud by "clear and convincing" evidence.
Unfortunately, this conclusion by FCA critics fails for at least two
reasons. First, it does not accurately explain the history and reasoning
behind the "clear and convincing" standard of proof for civil fraud
cases and does not clarify why many jurisdictions have adopted the
lower standard of "preponderance" for such cases. Second, the argu-
ment mischaracterizes the relationship and interaction between the
government and the contractors delivering goods and services to the
government. This Section of the Article will define the phrase "bur-
den of proof," layout the history behind the "clear and convincing"
burden of proof standard, and show that many state legislatures, Con-
gress, and the federal courts have rejected this standard for certain
types of fraud cases.
A. Burden of Proof. The Meaning of the Phrase
Although an often used word in legal vocabulary, the term
"proof" lacks a definitive meaning; it can refer to evidence, such as
documents used at trial, or to one's certainty as to whether or not a
proposed state of events actually took place. 75 Since the word "proof"
has various meanings, it naturally follows that the expression "burden
of proof" retains these same sorts of definitional ambiguities.76 In our
system of law, however, the phrase "burden of proof" has come to
refer to two distinct and separate concepts.77 ProfessorJames Bradley
Thayer was the first to point out the two different aspects of the
phrase in his 1898 work.78 "The two distinct concepts may be referred
to as: (1) the risk of nonpersuasion, or the burden of persuasion or
simply persuasion burden; (2) the duty of producing evidence, the
burden of going forward with the evidence, or simply the production
burden or the burden of evidence."
79
75 "'Proof' is an ambiguous word." MCCoRMICKx ON EVIDENCE 947 (Edward Wil-
liam Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
76 "[T]he phrase [burden of proof] is an ambiguous one; and its uncertainty runs
into and perplexes the subject of evidence, so that the student of that subject needs to
reflect carefully on these ambiguities." JAMEs BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREA-
TISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 354 (1898).
77 SeeFLEMINGJAMES,JR. & GEoFREYC. HAZARD,JR., CVIL PRoCEDURE 313 (3d ed.
1985); see also Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof 47 VA. L. REv. 51 (1961).
78 See THAYER, supra note 76, at 353.
79 JAMEs & HAzARD, supra note 77, at 314.
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1. Burden of Proof: The Burden of Producing Evidence
This aspect of the term "burden of proof' generally takes on im-
portance at the beginning of a trial. The party assigned the burden of
proof must produce and offer to the court enough evidence to over-
come the possibility of a directed verdict for the opponent. Essen-
tially, if the party with the burden of proof puts forth enough
evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in the party's favor,
that party has met the burden of proof. The burden of producing
evidence affords the judge control over the case from its outset. A
party with the burden of proof who does not present sufficient evi-
dence, from ajudicial perspective, to sustain his or her allegations will
lose the case through procedural devices such as non-suit, directed
verdict, or dismissal.
2. Burden of Proof: The Burden of Persuasion
The phrase "burden of proof" encompasses a second meaning
which relates to the persuasive function of the evidence that a party
produces during litigation. Once a party, generally the plaintiff,
meets the initial burden of production, each party will produce evi-
dence in an effort to persuade the jury, or the judge in a bench trial,
as to the validity of its case. The party with the burden of persuasion
must produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury that its claim
against the opponent merits a decision for that party. This function of
the burden of persuasion essentially directs how a trier of fact should
decide in those instances in which the "trier's mind is in equipose."8 10
In those instances when the trier's mind is in equipose, the party car-
rying the burden of proof should not prevail in the case.
3. The Three Different Burden of Proof Standards
The burden of persuasion standard indicates "the quantity and
quality" of the evidence that the party carrying the burden of proof
must produce at trial in order to win.8 ' Over time, three different
standards for the burden of persuasion have evolved. These three
standards signify a societal, although often judicially imposed, deci-
sion balancing the nature of the conduct involved against the severity
of the penalty or the desire for deterrence. Most civil actions require
the plaintiff to prove the case by a preponderance of the evidence.
This verbal formulation seems to stand for the proposition that a party
80 Id. at 314.
81 JOHN C. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALs 992 (7th ed.
1997).
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must bring forth evidence at trial that would lead the trier to believe
"that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its non-
existence." 82 Thus, the meaning ascribed to the phrase "preponder-
ance of the evidence" appears to refer to the level of certainty created
in the trier of fact's mind as to whether or not the event took place or
the fact exists.
8 3
In a very limited number of civil actions, the "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence standard has replaced the traditional preponderance
standard. 4 The classes of civil actions that use the higher burden of
proof standard include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) charges of fraud and undue influence,
(2) suits on oral contracts to make a will, and suits to establish the
terms of a lost will,
(3) suits for the specific performance of an oral contract,
(4) proceedings to set aside, reform or modify written transactions
or official acts on grounds of fraud, mistake or incompleteness,
and
(5) miscellaneous types of claims and defenses, varying from state
to state, where there is thought to be special danger of decep-
tion, or where the court considers that the particular type of
claim should be disfavored on policy grounds.8 5
The use of this intermediate standard implies that the trier of fact
must have a higher degree of certainty as to the litigated event or fact
then under the preponderance standard.8 6 How much higher re-
82 McCoRMIcK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 75, at 957 (footnote omitted). "An alter-
native phrase often used is greater weight of the evidence." JAMES & HAZARD, supra note
77, at 316.
83 Preponderance of the evidence can be used in the criminal law context in the
sentencing stage. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1979) ("Sentenc-
ing courts have traditionally heard evidence and found facts without any prescribed
burden of proof.... We see nothing in Pennsylvania's scheme [stating that prepon-
derance of the evidence is used during sentencing] that would warrant constitutional-
izing burdens of proof at sentencing.") (citations omitted).
84 This higher burden of proof standard has been phrased in many different ways
by courts, including "clear, convincing and satisfactory," "clear, cogent and convinc-
ing," and "clear, unequivocal, satisfactory, and convincing" to name just a few. See
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 75, at 959.
85 Id. at 960-61 (footnotes omitted).
86 Fraud must also satisfy a higher pleading standard under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). But "[n]o very persuasive reason for this
requirement has ever been advanced." VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES
IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 843 (1994). Judges like Richard Posner have suggested that
the element of particularity in Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) is required for the following rea-
son: "Accusation of fraud can do serious damage to the goodwill of a business firm or
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mains unclear. "No high degree of precision can be attained
by... groups of adjectives"8 7 such as "clear and convincing" or "clear
and unequivocal." Unlike the preponderance standard, the clear and
convincing standard calls on the jury, or the judge, to make a much
more subjective determination about the persuasive quality of the evi-
dence introduced by both parties at trial. Thus, the inherent uncer-
tainty as to the meaning of "clear and convincing" coupled with the
more subjective nature of evaluation gives juries and judges wider lati-
tude to import a meaning into the phrase on a case-by-case basis.88
The lack of precision and the subjective nature of the phrase probably
means that the use of such a standard may introduce more uncer-
tainty into civil fraud litigation rather than less.
The highest standard of proof, "beyond a reasonable doubt," is
saved for criminal trials. With respect to the criminal justice system,
society has determined that an individual's life and liberty should not
a professional person. People should be discouraged from tossing such accusations
into complaints in order to induce advantageous settlements or for other ulterior
purposes." Bankers Trust Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir.
1992). The 9(b) particularity requirement regarding fraud may have the same source
as the heightened burden of proof standard: equity courts. The particularity require-
ment is not found in older legal treatises on fraud and actions at law but is read in
older equity treatises. The particularity requirement "probably originated in equity
pleading and reflected a reluctance to upset or investigate judgments, settled ac-
counts and other completed transactions." William M. Richman et al., The Pleading of
Fraud: Rhymes Without Reason, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 967 (1987). And like the higher
burden of proof standard for fraud, although "the original motivating policy no
longer fit, new purposes were articulated and adapted." Id. at 968. For history and
analysis of the heightened pleading for fraud, see generally id. Whatever the source,
the "damage to goodwill" rationale seems inapplicable in the case of government de-
fense contractors. In 1985, the Department of Defense found that 45 of the nation's
top 100 defense contractors were under investigation for fraud offenses. In that same
report, the Department of Defense stated that nine of the top 10 defense contractors
were under investigation for fraud. See History of the Law (visited Dec. 28, 1999)
<www.philipsandcohen.com/html/body/history.htm>. In 1999, most, if not all, of
those same defense contractors are still providing the nation with weapons and reap-
ing large profits. In the defense contractor arena, a charge of fraud seems to do very
little in the way of damage to goodwill.
87 McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 75, at 959.
88 The phrases "preponderance of the evidence" and "clear and convincing...
are awkward vehicles for expressing the degree of the jury's belief" and really fail to
provide for a quantifiable amount of evidence upon which to rest a verdict. Id. at
956-57 (footnote omitted). Although advocates of the clear and convincing standard
assume that this verbal formulation has a significant effect on juries with respect to
the evidence, the phrase probably does no more than put the jury "more in a frame of
mind to resist persuasion than ... the usual test, and it is doubtful whether anything
more can be done where a difference in degree is sought in dealing with factors so
subjective and imponderable." JAMEs & HAzARD, supra note 77, at 55.
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be taken unless the judicial process has provided the jury or judge
with an extremely high level of certainty regarding the litigated event
or facts.
B. The Origin of the "Clear and Convincing" Burden of Proof Standard
in Civil Fraud Cases
A simple look at the history of equity courts in England and the
United States and their handling of civil fraud cases explains the ori-
gin of the present day "clear and convincing" standard of proof for
civil fraud. Despite the contention and desire of critics of the FCA,
the standard for proving civil fraud has not always been by "clear and
convincing" evidence. Rather, the "clear and convincing" burden of
proof standard has been incorporated by the courts in this country
during this century with the merger of law and equity in the federal
system and in most state court systems.
The "clear and convincing" standard of proof for civil fraud ac-
tions arose from the differences in the doctrines, rules, and available
remedies administered by the courts of law and equity in England and
later adopted by the various court systems in America. In the courts of
common law, in both England and the United States,
"there . . . [were] certain prescribed forms of action to which the
party... [had to] resort to furnish him a remedy." 9 If the facts of a
particular case did not conform to the rigid requirements of the vari-
ous forms of action at law, then a plaintiff could not bring suit despite
the just nature of his cause.90
Due to the character of the proceedings and the rules governing
those proceedings, certain types of evidence were inadmissible to
prove fraud in courts of law.9' Under laws like the Statute of Frauds
or the Wills Act, parol evidence could not be introduced as evidence
to prove fraud regarding dealings in property which were unwritten.
Yet, in those actions for fraud which could be brought in a court of
law, the burden of proof was by preponderance of the evidence. 92
89 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUrIYJuRISPRUDENCE AS ADMrNISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AmaiucA 23 (W.H. Lyon, Jr., ed., 14th ed. 1918).
90 See id. at 24 ("From their very character and organization... [courts of law]
are incapable of the remedy, which the mutual rights and relative situations of the
parties, under the circumstances, positively require.").
91 See MELviLLE M. BiGELOW, THE LAW OF FRAuD AND THE PROCEDURE PERTAINING
TO THE REDRESS THEREOF 472 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1877).
92 See id. at 474.
It is settled law that, upon the trial of a civil action in which the claim or
defence is based on alleged fraud, the issue may be determined in accord-
ance with the preponderance or weight of evidence .... In . . .cases of
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The courts of equity in England and America represented a doc-
trinal departure from the common law courts.9 3 Early treatises on the
subject of equity jurisprudence "defined the very nature of equity to
be the correction of the law wherein it is defective by reason of its
universality. '94 As distinguished from other courts, equity courts
looked notjust to the letter of the law, but to the "reason and spirit"95
for enacting the law.96 Thus, equity courts, unlike courts of law, al-
lowed parties to introduce parol evidence to prove facts regarding the
circumstances surrounding a written document or a deal involving no
writing.
Equity courts also differentiated themselves from common law
courts through the rights they acknowledged and the remedies they
administered. 97 Equity courts "would enforce trusts (by which one
could evade the common law rule that one could not devise land by
will) and assignments of claims" neither of which common law courts
acknowledged. 98 Equity courts, however, did recognize these so-called
equitable estates and provided parties with remedies against abuses
like unconscionable bargains, betrayals of confidences, and the like.
In addition to the differences in the types of rights recognized by
the two court systems, the remedies available to plaintiffs varied be-
tween the two courts. Courts of law traditionally dealt only in money
damages, while courts of equity could, and would, afford a plaintiff
"specific performance, recission and reformation of contracts and
other documents."99 Injunctions were also within the exclusive do-
fraud, nothing more is required than that the evidence should be sufficient
to satisfy the conscience of a common man, although the evidence does not
amount to an absolute certainty.... Hence, an instruction to the jury that
the fraud in question could not be found by them, except upon clear and
undoubted proof of it, is erroneous. If the party alleging the fraud produce
such evidence as the jury could reasonably and safely rest their consciences
upon, it is sufficient.
Id. at 474-75 (footnotes ommitted).
93 For a concise history of the origin and history of equity courts and equity juris-
prudence, see STORY, supra note 89, at 42-63, and RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COL-
LINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 13-16 (1996).
94 STORY, supra note 89, at 3 (footnote omitted).
95 Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
96 "[I] t is by no means uncommon to represent that the peculiar duty of a Court
of Equity is to supply the defects of the common law, and next, to correct its rigor or
injustice." Id. at 17 (footnote omitted).
97 "Another peculiarity of Courts of Equity is that they can administer remedies
for rights, which rights Courts of Common Law do not recognize at all .... " Id. at 25.
98 FREER & PERDUE, supra note 93, at 14-15.
99 Id. at 15.
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main of equity courts, whereas courts of law could not fashion and
apply this type of remedy.
The methods of enforcing 'Judicial decisions" also differentiated
the two court systems.' 00 Courts of law "enforced... judgements...
in remn... against property."10' If a defendant lost a money judgment
and subsequently refused to pay the plaintiff, a plaintiff could request
a writ of execution.10 2 A writ of execution allowed a sheriff to seize
the defendant's property, sell it at public auction, and use the sale's
proceeds to satisfy the plaintiff's money judgment.'03 A money judg-
ment, however, was a pyrrhic victory if the defendant had no assets for
the sheriff to seize and sell, for instance, if the defendant was judg-
ment proof. Equity courts, though, "enforced... decrees in personam,
that is, against the person.' 0 4 A defendant who refused to obey an
equity judge's decree could find himselfjailed until he agreed to com-
ply with the decree.105
Thus, in looking at the two court systems in an historical context,
courts of equity represent a trend toward increasingly flexible rules
and remedies, and away from the static methods and remedies of the
courts of law. With this move to flexibility, however, judges in the
equity system obtained expanded powers and the increased ability to
alter the lives of those persons who entered into the equity courts.
Commentators, in recognition of the tremendous power of equity
courts, have noted that equity was a kind of forum of last resort. Dis-
cussing the equity court character of the new Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Challen B. Ellis expressed the following concerns about
the adoption of the Rules:
The fundamental difference between law and equity is that law
is concerned with the settlement of an issue of fact by a jury and
does not in any manner involve any restraint on the person of the
plaintiff or defendant ....
Thus, the flexible rules and remedies in equity not only tend to repair
the inadequacies of the law, but they do in fact protect him whose property
is about to be wrested from him through an unconscionable, oppressive, and
unjust contract, the enforcement of which is not necessary to the one, and
would work a needless hardship upon the other.
STORY, supra note 89, at 27.
100 FREER & PERDuE, supra note 93, at 15.
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Considering the tremendous powers of the chancellor and dan-
gers of abuse, certain safeguards were thrown around an action in
equity which would not be needed nor appropriate in an action at
law.
One of the first and most important safeguards is that equity is
always an extraordinary remedy; that is, the drastic action of the
court against the person of the parties may not be exercised unless
that is the only way the complainant can escape irreparable injury
106
Thus, equity rules and procedures, including those relating to fraud,
should be seen as methods by which equity judges placed limits on the
reach of equity courts. Equity rules forced plaintiffs to go above and
beyond the requirements of courts of law because the potential equi-
table remedies could be so drastic in scope.
1. Fraud and Equity Courts
The courts of common law and equity had, in most instances,
concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving fraud.10 7 This, however,
does not mean that the jurisdiction of equity courts coincided exactly
with that of the law courts. In certain situations, the equity courts had
exclusive jurisdiction over cases "in which fraud [was] utterly ir-
remedial at law."10 8 Not only did the equity courts provide relief
against fraud in these cases, but they often went against the rules laid
down in the courts of law to do so.1 09
106 Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts: Hearings Before a Sub-
comm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., on S.J. Res.
281, A Joint Resolution to Postpone the Effective Date of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States, Part 2, 75th Cong. 29, 46-47 (1938).
107 One large exception to this general rule of concurrent jurisdiction is the ob-
taining of a will by fraud. "The proper remedy... [was] exclusively vested in other
courts... ." STORY, supra note 89, at 260.
108 Id. at 261.
109 See id.
Whatever amounts to fraud, according to the legal conception, is also
fraud in the equitable conception; but the converse of this statement is not
true. The equitable theory of fraud is much more comprehensive than that
of the law, and contains elements entirely different from any which enter
into the legal notion.
2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATIsE ON EQUITYJURISPRUDENCE 1802 (4th ed. 1918).
Lord Coke, by the same passage in which he confines the jurisdiction of
Courts of Equity to "such frauds, covins and deceits for which there is no
remedy by the ordinary course of Law," admits that all frauds are not relieva-
ble at law: and Lord Hardwicke judicially declared, that, "the points of fraud
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In order not to unduly circumscribe their jurisdiction over the
wide variety of potential fraud cases, equity courts defined fraud with
broad brush strokes." 0 At its most basic, fraud, defined by equity
courts, "properly include[d] all acts, omissions, and concealments
which involve[d] a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confi-
dence, justly reposed, and... [were] injurious to another, or by which
an undue and unconscientious advantage . . . [was] taken of an-
other.""' With this expansive definition, early equity jurisprudence
commentators often divided fraud into five different categories: 1)
"Frauds which... [are] actual, arising from facts and circumstances of
imposition"; 2) Fraud that "may be apparent from the intrinsic nature
and subject of the bargain itself, such as no man in his senses and not
under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and
fair man would accept on the other; which are inequitable and uncon-
scientious bargains, and of such even the common law has taken no-
tice"; 3) "Fraud which may be presumed from the circumstances and
condition of the parties contracting; and this goes farther than the
rule of law, which is that it must be proved, not presumed"; 4) "Fraud
which may be collected and inferred in the consideration of a Court
of Equity, from the nature and circumstances of the transaction, as
being an imposition and deceit on other persons, not parties to the
fraudulent agreement"; 5) "Fraud in what are called catching bargains
with heirs, reversioners, or expectants in the life of the parents.""12
Looking at these various scenarios, what differentiated courts of
equity from courts of law is that courts of equity would presume fraud
under certain circumstances; courts of law never presumed fraud. 113
and collusion establish the authority of the Court of Chancery, often con-
trary to, and beyond, the rules of Law."
1 JOHN EYEYN HOVENDEN, A GENERAL. TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE BY
WHICH COURTS OF EQUITY ARE GUIDED AS TO THE PREVENTION OR REMEDIAL CORREC-
TION OF FRAUD 15 (New York, Collins & Hannay 1832) (footnotes omitted).
110 See 1 MELvLLE M. BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FRAUD ON ITS CIVIL
SIDE 3 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1890). "Fraud is infinite; and were a court of
equity once to lay down rules, how far they would go, and no farther, in extending
their relief against it, or to define strictly the species or evidence of it, the jurisdiction
would be cramped, and perpetually eluded by new schemes, which the fertility of
man's invention would contrive." Id. at 3 n.2 (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTA-
RIES ON EQUrIYJuRISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 185 n.2
(Jarius W. Perry ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 12th ed. 1877)).
111 STORY, supra note 89, at 262. "Fraud consists in endeavor to alter rights, by
deception touching motives, or by circumvention not touching motives." BIGELOW,
supra note 110, at 5 (footnote omitted).
112 STORY, supra note 89, at 263; see also POMEROY, supra note 109, at 1805 (break-
ing down fraud into only four categories).
113 See STORY, supra note 89, at 264.
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"In other words Courts of Equity [would] grant relief upon the
ground of fraud established by presumptive evidence, which evidence
courts of law would not always deem sufficient proof to justify a verdict
at law."1 14 Thus, as opposed to courts of law that "presume[d] all men
to deal fairly and to be honest,"11 5 equity courts could find fraud
based on circumstantial evidence that did not meet the standards re-
quired to prove fraud in the courts of law.
2. Civil Fraud and the Burden of Proof
Both equity and law courts placed the burden of proof on the
party making the allegations of fraud. Yet, here is where clarity stops
and confusion begins. The early treatises on the subject of equity ju-
risprudence made a distinction between the standard for the burden
of proof and the standard for the type of evidence required to meet
that burden of proof. To succeed at trial, a plaintiff had to "prove the
fraud, which means that he... [had to] show it by clear and satisfac-
tory evidence, such as will preponderate over [the] presumption [of
innocence] or evidence on the other side."
116
Although not directly so stated in cases, the rationale behind this
rule appears to stem from ajudicial belief that courts of equity would
become a veritable legal safe haven for individuals wishing to get out
of bad deals. Equity judges surmised that if equity courts retained the
preponderance standard used in the law courts, combined with the
powerful equitable remedies, the methods for forcing defendant com-
pliance, and the willingness to find fraud based on either testimony
not admissible in courts of law or circumstantial evidence not cogniza-
114 Id.
115 PHILIP T. VAN ZIL., A TREATISE ON EQurry PLEADING AND PRACTICE 411 (1904).
116 BIGELOW, supra note 110, at 123 (footnote omitted); see also Louis L. HAMMON,
HAMMON ON EVIDENCE 24 (1907) ("The strict measure of evidence required in crimi-
nal cases does not obtain in civil procedures .... Thus a preponderance of evidence
is sufficient to establish fraud . . . .") (footnotes omitted); 3 CLARK A. NIcHOLs, Ap-
PLIED EVIDENCE 2324 (1928) ("A preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to prove
fraud .... Notwithstanding judicial expressions concerning necessity of clear and
satisfactory proof of fraud, the code rule that a preponderance of the evidence con-
trols in a civil case applies in a civil case, where fraud is claimed.") (footnotes omit-
ted). "The party alleging fraud is the one who assumes the burden of establishing it,
and whether he be plaintiff or defendant he must do so by a preponderance of the
evidence." JOHN W. SMITH, A TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF FRAUDS AND THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS 280 (1907). "Evidence must be clear and satisfactory." Id. at 287. On allega-
tions of fraud, an equity court should not set aside a conveyance upon parol evidence
alone unless "the preponderance of the evidence should be clear, and the evidence
should be so convincing as to leave no reasonable doubt upon the mind." VAN ZILE,
supra note 115, at 410-11 (quoting Hunter v. Hopkins, 12 Mich. 227, 229 (1864)).
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ble in courts of law, would-be plaintiffs would flock to the courts of
equity.
The requirement in civil actions of more than a preponderance
of the evidence was first applied in equity to claims which experi-
ence had shown to be inherently subject to fabrication, lapse of
memory, or the flexibility of the conscience. Conceding the validity
of policies which the parol evidence rule and the Statutes of Wills
and Frauds were designed to carry out, the chancery courts compro-
mised between becoming a mecca for the trumped-up prayer for
relief and refusing altogether to mitigate the stem fulfillment of
these policies in the law courts, by granting relief only in cases
where the evidence in support of this type of claim was "clear and
convincing."
n 7
With the creation and congressional adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal line between courts of law and
equity disappeared. 1" 8 The rules provided for only one form of action
called a "civil action."" 9 Most state court systems followed suit, merg-
ing their two courts systems. 120 Although certain distinctions between
117 Note, Appellate Review in the Federal Courts of Findings Requiring More Than a Pre-
ponderance of the Evidence, 60 HARv. L. Rrv. 111, 112 (1946) (footnotes omitted); see
also Note, Homer v. Flynn: A Preponderance of Clear and Convincing Evidence, 28 ME. L.
REv. 240, 241 (1976) [hereinafter Clear and Convincing Evidence] ("The policy of a
stricter standard of proof in fraud cases is derived from early equity decisions. The
requirement of 'clear and convincing evidence' was created in order to avoid a direct
clash with the Statute of Frauds and the Wills Act when parol evidence was allowed to
contradict the terms of written instruments.").
[I]f there exists in courts of chancery, a capacity, or right, or duty, or disposi-
tion, to find fraud, upon less proof, or different proof, from that which is
required in courts of law, a ground of preference between the two jurisdic-
tions is at once established, which was never before claimed, and one of a
very invidious character in its practical operation.
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUrIYJURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENG-
LAND AND AMEICA § 190a (Jarius W. Perry ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1877).
The requirement of proof more than usually convincing for certain
types of contentions seems to have had its origins in the standards pre-
scribed for themselves by the chancellors in determining questions of fact in
equity cases....
Among the classes of cases to which this special standard or persuasion
has been applied are.., charges of fraud ....
McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 75, at 960 (footnotes omitted).
118 See FREER & PERDUE, supra note 93, at 15-16.
119 FED. K Civ. P. 2.
120 See FREER & PERD E, supra note 93, at 16.
2000] 1443
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
law and equity still remain,121 in many areas "equity prac-
tice ... dominate[s] modem procedure."1 22
The consolidation of courts of equity with courts of law helped
not only to perpetuate the confusion over the correct burden of proof
standard in civil fraud cases, but may have added to judicial confusion
over the subject. Homer v. Flynn123 stands out as a prime example of
how this legal "Gordian Knot" perplexed individuals at the highest
levels of our legal system. In Homer, a shareholder of a small corpora-
tion encouraged an outside investor to purchase an interest in the
company. The investor later found out that the sales reports he
viewed were false, and he sued the shareholder for fraud.
During trial, the defendant requested the trial judge to instruct
the jury that the plaintiff had to prove his case by "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence. The trial judge, instead, instructed the jury that the
burden of proof for a civil fraud action was a preponderance of the
evidence. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that "the burden
of proof in fraud cases requires only a preponderance of the evidence,
but that such a preponderance can be effected only by evidence which
is clear and convincing." 124 In an apparent effort to reduce the quan-
dary this decision produced, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court later
overturned Homer and instituted the "clear and convincing" standard.
This history of the burden of proof standard in civil fraud cases
makes it evident that the "clear and convincing" standard did not
evolve from an empirical study of civil fraud cases. Rather, the "clear
and convincing" standard was a child conceived in the unproven be-
lief on the part of equity judges that equity courts would be consumed
by unworthy or unmeritorious civil fraud cases. With the general col-
lapse of the courts of equity and law into one system, the burden of
proof standard of equity courts was carried over with little or no exam-
ination as to whether or not its original justifications were present in
the new court systems. Thus, the contention by critics that the pre-
ponderance standard contained in the FCA does not follow the histor-
ical norm is unfounded. Critics of the FCA evidence a
misunderstanding of the origin of the "clear and convincing" burden
121 The Constitution still guarantees the right to ajury trial in civil suits at com-
mon law, and there are differences between legal and equitable remedies.
122 Id. at 16. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
123 334 A.2d 194 (Me. 1975), overruled by Taylor v. Commissioner of Mental Health
& Mental Retardation, 481 A.2d 139 (Me. 1984). For an in-depth analysis of the case
and the Maine Supreme Court's decision, see Clear and Convincing Evidence, supra
note 117.
124 Id. at 240-41 (footnotes omitted).
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of proof standard, and thus make arguments about the FCA's need for
modification based on inaccurate premises.
III. FALSE CLAivls AcT AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF: TBE NEW TREND
Critics of the 1986 amendments to the FCA assert that the Act's
"relaxed standard of proof is inconsistent with the more stringent re-
quirements for showing fraud in the private sector."' 25 These critics
state that the more stringent "dear and convincing" burden of proof
standard is the common law standard and is the standard "most courts
require" for a plaintiff to successfuflly prove fraud.126 As the previous
Section points out, this argument is inaccurate. The original burden
of proof standard for civil fraud cases in courts of law was a prepon-
derance standard. Only after the consolidation of equity courts with
law courts in this country did the "clear and convincing" standard be-
come the majority standard in civil fraud proceedings.
In addition to misstating the origin of the standard, commenta-
tors on the FCA also fail to point out several important facts with re-
gard to the "clear and convincing" burden of proof standard in civil
actions analogous to fraud. First, the standard has not been univer-
sally accepted in the United States. Various states still retain the pre-
ponderance standard for fraud.127 This variation among the states as
to the requisite burden of proof in civil fraud cases means that there
exists no categorical rule. At least ten states, including California,
128
Colorado, and Florida, use a preponderance of the evidence standard
in all civil fraud cases. 129 Two other states, Nebraska and Ohio, make
a clear distinction between the evidentiary requirements in cases at
125 An Obstacle, supra note 4, at 25.
126 Id. at 26.
127 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
128 Although critics claim that the False Claims Act's legal regime is a significant
barrier to entry, the preponderance standard seems not to have significantly inhibited
the growth of the commercial sector in California. California uses a preponderance
standard for civil fraud cases. As it stands now, California has at least the seventh
largest economy in the world and accounts for approximately 13% of the United
States' Gross Domestic Product. In particular, California accounted for almost 30%
of the nation's exports in electronics and electrical products and 24% of the com-
puter equipment as measured by the value of the goods. All of this data seems to
suggest that the critics of the False Claims Act significantly overestimate the effect of
the Act's standard of proof on the commercial sector's decision making process. See
California Trade and Commerce Agency: About California (visited Aug. 23, 1998) <http://
commerce.ca.gov/california>.
129 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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law and in equity, requiring only a preponderance of the evidence
standard for fraud cases at law.
130
Second, many states have enacted laws to deal with government
procurement abuses that mirror the FCA and include a preponder-
ance burden of proof standard. California enacted the California
False Claims Act13 1 and modeled the Act upon the federal statute, in-
cluding the preponderance of the evidence standard.132 Like Califor-
nia, Florida also enacted a False Claims Act 133 designed like the
federal law and containing a preponderance standard. 34 Although
not denominated as a False Claims Act, the Illinois Whistleblower Re-
ward and Protection Act' 35 is another state produced piece of legisla-
tion aimed at deterring persons from taking advantage of the public
fisc and giving the state a mechanism through which to regain that
money. As in the previously mentioned statutes, the Illinois incarna-
tion of the FCA states that preponderance is the Act's burden of proof
standard.'3 6
The District of Columbia, in 1996, passed a form of FCA in the
Procurement Reform Amendment Act of 1996.137 The D.C. statute
also requires a plaintiff to prove each element of the offense by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.as8 In another variation on the FCA
theme, Tennessee established the Tennessee Medicaid False Claims
Act.139 Again, like the above mentioned acts, the Medicaid Act also
uses the preponderance standard as its burden of proof standard.
140
More recently, Louisiana and Texas have joined the trend by states of
enacting FCA-like laws.
Third, the United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts
have adopted the "preponderance" standard in a variety of statutes
that are analogous to civil fraud. In civil RICO cases, the federal
courts have determined that "preponderance" of the evidence is the
appropriate standard required of a plaintiff to successfully prove his
130 See id.
131 See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12650-55 (West 1992).
132 See id. § 12654(c).
133 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 68.081-.092 (West 1995).
134 See id. § 68.09.
135 See 740 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 175/1-175/8 (West 1995).
136 See id. 175/5.
137 See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1188.5 to .11 (1997); see also W. Bruce Shirk, District of
Columbia False Claims Act: A Comparison to the Federal Statute (visited Nov. 20, 1998)
<http://pgfm.com/publications/falseclaims.html>.
138 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1188.11(c) (1997).
139 See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 71-5-181-86 (1995).
140 See id. § 71-5-184(c) (1995).
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or her case.' 41 This means that predicate acts of fraud need only be
proven by a preponderance of evidence under civil RICO. In civil,
private anti-trust actions, federal courts insist that the plaintiff prove
all the elements of the statute by a preponderance of the evidence.
142
Bankruptcy fraud also requires plaintiffs to prove fraud by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 143 Plaintiffs in private causes of action for
securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 need only prove their cases by a preponderance of the evi-
dence,'4 and the SEC must also prove fraud in securities actions by a
preponderance of the evidence. 145 Thus, the FCA is not alone as a
federal statute that allows plaintiffs in civil suits to prove their cases by
a preponderance of the evidence.
In making the decision to mandate a "clear and convincing" stan-
dard for the burden of proof, the United States Supreme Court has
stated that it "required proof by clear and convincing evidence where
particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake."
146
The Court has determined that such important interests and rights
include proceedings to terminate parental rights, 47 involuntary com-
mitment proceedings,' 48 and deportation. 49 At no time, though, has
the Court ever equated the risk of potentially large money damages
with the interest and rights mentioned previously. For the Court to
do so would amount to placing liberty on an equal footing with
141 See Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1296 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that
predicate acts of fraud under civil RICO require only a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard); Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1302-03 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies in civil actions
under Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(1994), which allows for treble damage awards).
142 See Chrysler Credit Corp. v.J. Truett Payne Co., 670 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1982);
Clark Marine Corp. v. Cargill, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 103, 111 (E.D. La. 1964) (holding
that the preponderance standard applies in civil actions seeking a treble damages
award under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994)).
143 See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991); In re Comner, 191 B.R. 199 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1995).
144 See Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (holding that pre-
ponderance of the evidence was required in a private civil action under section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bu-
reau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (stating that common law doctrines of fraud that
developed during a period when transactions involved tangible items do not seem
applicable to transactions in a modem economy involving intangibles like securities).
145 See SEC v. Lorin, 877 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
146 Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 389.
147 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
148 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
149 See Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
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money, an idea still repugnant to most Americans despite our society's
preference for, and tendency to, resort to markets in which everything
has a price. Thus, for critics of the FCA to argue for a higher burden
of proof standard for the Act is to fly in the face of Supreme Court
rationale which dictates that the "clear and convincing" burden of
proof standard should apply only in cases involving the changing of
one's liberty status.
IV. MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND THE FALSE CLAIMs Acr's STANDARD
OF PROOF
The 1986 amendments were a specific legislative response to the
documented problems unique to government procurement in gen-
eral, and military procurement in particular. Critics of the Act would
like to down play the significance of military procurement incentives
and practices when analyzing the Act's effects. A look at the nation's
budget, however, quickly shows that the various institutional incen-
tives inherent in the military procurement system are behind the en-
actment and enforcement of the FCA.150
Critics insist that the FCA, as it presently exists, inhibits private
sector suppliers and government purchasers of goods and services
from behaving as private sector commercial actors. What this argu-
ment fails to acknowledge is that government purchases, unlike com-
mercial dealings, are generally not motivated by profit and loss
considerations. The military buys goods and services in order to effec-
tively accomplish an endeavor-war-that it hopes it will never be
forced to prosecute. Yet the most significant differences between
commercial dealings and military procurement are the incentives of
the decision-making institutions involved. Members of Congress, De-
partment of Defense civilian employees, and military officials of the
various services all have different motivations for procurement of cer-
tain goods and services, none of which are based on profit motive.
Thus, the argument that the FCA, designed to account for the actions
150 President Truman expressed his disgust at the lack of scrutiny regarding mili-
tary spending in the following passage:
It's an amazing thing. Every ten cents that was [sic] spent [on social
welfare programs,] ... every dime was looked into, and somebody was always
against spending a nickel that would help poor people and give jobs.., to
the men that didn't have any.
But the minute we started spending all that defense money, the sky was
the limit and no questions asked. The "economy boys" never opened their
mouths about that, and I don't understand it. I don't now, and I didn't
then.
MILLER, supra note 41, at 163-64 (quoting President Harry S. Truman).
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of persons involved in the military procurement system, should reflect
commercial realities seems ill-conceived.
An understanding of the history of military procurement and the
economic incentives peculiar to that system will show that the FCA, as
presently enacted, is an effective and necessary means for achieving a
government procurement system with a reduced level of waste and
fraud. The preponderance burden of proof standard reflects the fact
that the players involved in the military procurement process respond
to economic incentives that are different from those in the private
sector.
A. A Brief History of Profiteering in Defense Spending
The problems of false claims and fraud in defense spending are
not new problems in this country.' 5 ' Before the FCA was enacted in
1863, our nation's history was replete with instances of individuals tak-
ing undue advantage of the Government during the inevitable chaos
and dire Government needs normally experienced in times of war.
The history of the Revolutionary War contains numerous instances of
defense spending corruption involving both merchants and high Gov-
ernment officials.'5 2 These corrupt practices involved co-mingling of
funds, unauthorized use of government assets, inadequate record
keeping, bid rigging, and collusion between Government officials and
merchants.153 Not long after the end of the Revolutionary War,
151 One need only look at the history of defense spending in countries around the
world to realize that fraud and false claims are an inherent part of the defense pro-
curement process.
The military-industrial complex in the United States is a fairly new phe-
nomenon. It has existed in other nations and at other times, whenever there
were large peacetime armed forces and substantial arms-manufacturing insti-
tutions to support them. The problems this combination creates vary little
from nation to nation. You basically have a lot of corruption and ineffi-
ciency in military procurement no matter what the nation or era. In demo-
cratic America, as we have seen, you also have a serious warping of the
legislative process because the military-industrial complex distributes its con-
tracts among select congressional districts so as to secure the votes needed to
maintain large defense allocations in future budgets.
JAMES F. DUNNIGAN & ALBERT A. Non, SHOOTING BLANKs: WAR MAKING THAT DOESN'T
WORK 338 (1991); see also WIL.IAM MANCHESTER, THE ARMs OF KRupp (1968) (describ-
ing the rise of the Krupp's weapons industry and its influence on the history of Ger-
man politics for over 400 years); see also Prominent Convictions End Bribery Scanda4
WASH. PosT, Dec. 24, 1998, at A12 (discussing a bribery scandal involving a former
NATO Secretary General).
152 See RICHARD F. KAUFMAN, THE WAR PROFITEERS 5-8 (1970).
153 See id. at 7.
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profiteers again "victimized the United States Army"1 54 in 1791 by sup-
plying U.S. troops with tents that did not meet Army standards and
boots that fell apart after only slight use.
155
The advent of the Civil War ushered in a new era of corrupt and
fraudulent practices aimed at acquiring defense dollars. 15 6 This new
level of fraud probably derives from the massive numbers of men and
arms required to prosecute a war in the industrial age. The words of
representative Charles H. Van Wyck seem to sum up best the
problems encountered by the Union in its attempts to outfit the coun-
try for war:
The government has been the victim of more than one conspir-
acy, and remarkable combinations have been formed to rob the
treasury. The profits from the sale of arms to the government have
been enormous, and realized, too, in many instances, even by our
own citizens, through a system of brokerage as unprincipled and
dishonest, as unfriendly to the success and welfare of the nation, as
the plotting of actual treason.1
57
With reports of soldiers opening up would-be crates of guns only to
find sawdust, muskets sold at twice their peacetime prices, and in-
stances of triple over-counting in the sale of animals to the Army, Pres-
ident Lincoln pushed for the enactment of a law to deter such activity
and recover the illicit gains of contractors committing fraud.'58 On
March 2, 1863, President Lincoln signed into law the False Claims Act
of 1863.1
59
154 JAMEs B. HELMER, JR. ET AL., FALsE CLAIMs Acr: WHISTLEBLOWERS LITIGATION 25
(1994).
155 Id.
156 See CLARK R. MOLLENHOFF, THE PENTAGON: POLITICS, PROFITS AND PLUNDER 41
(1967) ("The operations of the War Department in the Civil War still represent the
ultimate example of corruption in American military history. This period illustrates
almost everything that can go wrong with the military establishment when under cor-
rupt as well as incompetent political control.").
157 House Select Comm. to Inquire into Contracts of the Government, 37th Cong. 34
(1861), quoted in KAursIAN, supra note 152, at 8.
158 See HELMER, supra note 154, at 26-27. "During the Civil War, President Abra-
ham Lincoln groused that his troops found sawdust instead of gunpowder when they
pried open ammunition crates at the front. The cavalry discovered it was being
charged for the same horses two and three times." ANDY PASZTOR, WHEN THE PENTA-
GON WAS FOR SALE 11 (1995).
159 Act of March 2, 1863, ch 67, 12 Stat. 696. The False Claims Act was reenacted
as sections 3490-94 of the Revised Statutes, see 36 U.S. Rev. Stat. §§ 3490-94 (1875),
and section 5438 of the Revised Statutes, see 70 U.S. Rev. Stat. § 5438 (1875). Section
5438 was later codified under §§ 231-35 of Tide 31 of the United States Code, 31
U.S.C. §§ 231-35 (1976), and recodified in 1982 under §§ 3729-31 of Title 31 of the
United States Code, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31 (1982).
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Despite the enactment of this new law, fraud in defense con-
tracting did not abate before or during times of war.160 Both the
Spanish American War and World War I saw inexplicable acts of fraud
with regard to military procurement. 161 Bid rigging, deceptive ac-
counting practices, artificially high prices, payoffs of government and
military officials all took place while men in the trenches fought and
died. Public outrage at the practices resulted in several investigations
but with few tangible results.162 Yet, as military spending drastically
declined after both wars, as it had during all other prior post-war peri-
ods, public condemnation subsided and business as usual continued
in defense contracting.
Between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold
War, America changed its usual pattern of defense spending, 163 usher-
ing in a new era of defense contracting fraud. Although the defense
budget did not reach war levels, neither did it return to pre-war levels.
With the advent of the Cold War, the military-industrial complex had
set its roots into the American psyche and dramatically changed the
way our country spent money on defense, military manpower, and
procurement during the rest of the twentieth century.
From 1947 to 1997, military spending represented no less than
sixteen percent of the federal government's total expenditures, and
often was as high as sixty-nine percent during this period.164 Yet, this
figure dramatically underemphasizes the real import of military ex-
penditures in the federal budget. Although defense spending repre-
sented sixteen percent of the total federal outlays in 1997,165 as a
percentage of the federal government's discretionary spending in
1997, expenditures on national defense constituted almost half of all
the government's outlays. 166 In 1997 alone, the military spent over
160 "One million feet of lumber vanished from the Boston Navy Yard during the
corruption-stained administration of Ulysses S. Grant." PASZTOR, supra note 158, at
11.
161 "After World War I, President Warren Harding's administration was sent reel-
ing by the Teapot Dome scandal, which involved payment of bribes for leases of the
Navy's oil reserves in the West." Id.
162 See KAUFMAN, supra note 152, at 9-20.
163 See infra 1487 app. A.
164 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTVE OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.,
BuDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, HIsTomcAL TABLES, FiscAL YEAR 1999, at
42-49 (1998).
165 See id. at 74.
166 See id. at 102. "[T]he Pentagon will spend nearly $280 billion in 1999, more
than 55% of the total $500 billion discretionary spending package thrown together by
Congress .... " Center for Def. Info., Military Analysts Critical of Pentagon Spending
"Plus-Up" (visited Apr. 21, 2000) <http://www.cdi.org/press/fy99supp.html>.
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half of its $258 billion budget on operations and maintenance, pro-
curement, and research, development, test, and evaluation.' 67 No
other expenditures on goods and services in the discretionary portion
of the federal budget come close to this figure.
With these figures in mind, it is easy to see why concerns about
how military procurement of goods and services is perforned should
play an important role with regard to how the FCA functions. To
change the Act to accommodate relatively small expenditure patterns
in other parts of the budget without regard to the problems in de-
fense spending would, in essence, allow the tail to wag the dog-a dog
the size of tyrannosaurus rex.
It took over forty years for Congress to recognize and respond to
the new paradigm in defense spending by revising and updating the
FCA to deal with the Cold War and Post-Cold War defense spending
levels. In the interim period prior to the 1986 FCA amendments, the
country expended precious defense dollars on "$600 toilet seats and
$400 hammers,"'168 in addition to weapons that did not work as
advertised.
B. The Military Procurement Game: Lots of Dollars, Sometimes No Sense
To understand the military procurement system, one must first
recognize that the environment and relationships among defense con-
tractors, Congress, the Office of the President, the Department of De-
fense (DOD), the individual military services, and service members
bear little resemblance to a commercial environment or any sort of
commercial relationship among firms in the private sector. 69 Be-
cause the incentives that propel military spending do not correspond
167 See 1999 BUDGET, supra note 164, at 54. This figure does not include the coun-
try's expenditures on weapons and nuclear capabilities budgeted separately under the
State Department and the Energy Department, respectively.
168 JAMES G. BURTON, THE PENTAGON WARS 9 (1993).
169 For a unique perspective on which institutional players are involved in the mili-
tary procurement process and their influences on that process, see Gregory A. Bis-
chak, The Obstacles to Real Security: Military Corporatism and the Cold War State, in REAL
SECURITY- CONVERTING THE DEFENSE ECONOMY AND BUILDING PEACE 133 (Kevin J. Cas-
sidy & Gregory A. Bischak eds., 1993) [hereinafter REAL SECURrY]. "There can be
little doubt that the military and civilian professionals within the Pentagon, and their
supporters in Congress and the executive branch, have sought to promote the expan-
sion of military spending and their own bureaucratic control over resources." Id. at
148. This combination of Congressional, presidential, and bureaucratic support may
be an example of the failure of Madison's theory regarding the Constitution and its
ability to control factions. Though " [t] he regulation of these various and interfering
interests forms the principle task of modem legislation," in the defense context, all
the factions seem to have an incentive in perpetuating large defense budgets with
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to the incentives at work in the private commercial sector, the oppor-
tunities and likelihood for fraud are increased.
170
First, Congress controls the federal purse with regard to the mili-
tary' 71 and, thus, has tremendous influence on the military procure-
ment process. Although FCA critics would like one to believe that the
procurement process resembles a purely commercial setting, actions
by Congress indicate how fanciful that portrayal of the military pro-
curement process actually is. 172 Congress is a political institution
whose members are motivated by ideology, constituents, and re-elec-
tion and not the "bottom-line" like participants in private sector com-
mercial markets.173 Public choice theory economics shows how the
consistent friendly programs. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clin-
ton Rossiter ed., 1941).
170 Even those within the military procurement system understand that the envi-
ronment within that system differs dramatically from that of the private sector. See
Mark Cancian, Acquisition Reform: It's Not as Easy as It Seems, AcQuIsITION REV. Q., Sum-
mer 1995, at 189. "Yes, we all know that the defense industry is different. However,
reviewing the reasons why this is so will put the discussion about reform into perspec-
tive and remind us of how different the defense industry actually is from commercial
industry...." Id. at 190 (providing a list of eight things that differentiate the defense
industry from the commercial industry). "'There is no sensible reason to deny the
obvious.... The basic tenets of the free enterprise system do not apply [to the de-
fense industry].' As a result many, perhaps most, business practices common in com-
mercial industry for evaluating and controlling operations have no application in the
defense world." Id. at 191 (citations omitted).
171 See U.S CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-13.
172 See BARRY M. BLECHMAN, THE PoLtrncs OF NATIONAL SEcuRri. CONGRESS AND
U.S. DEFENSE POLICY 56 (1990).
The common congressional decision is to preserve programs, even
those unwanted by the military services and the secretary of defense. Con-
gressman Mahon, for example, kept the production line for the A-7 aircraft
open for years after Robert S. MacNamara has wanted to shut large numbers
of defense installations to reduce the department's overhead, but has been
prevented from doing so by congressional resistance.
Id.
173 "The criteria applied in congressional decision making are often inappropriate
from a national perspective: the overriding criterion in congressional deliberations
necessarily is to protect the interests of constituents. This often means that dollars
allocated for defense are used inefficiently." Id. at 55.
For the most part, senators' initiatives [are] intended to protect, or add
to, constituents' special interests ("pork" in the vernacular). They each
tended to involve relatively small amounts of money (that add up to large
sums). According to one senator's estimates, in the fiscal 1988 mark-up,
when authorizing committees cut roughly $30 billion from the administra-
tion's budget proposal overall, congressional initiatives still added some-
thing like $4-5 billion to the budget.
Id. at 47.
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behavior of Congress, a political institution, can be explained and
contrasted with the economics of market system transactions:
Government policy making is far removed from the anonymous de-
cision making that characterizes market transactions. Although
markets appear chaotic, they guide resources to their highest value
uses when allowed to Work. In contrast, government is personal and
political, and it is a serious mistake to talk about "the government"
or "federal and state governments" as if they are benevolent des-
pots. When "the government" guides the allocation of resources,
every decision becomes a political decision.
1 74
Public choice theory reveals that "political decision makers be-
have just like consumers and businesses."' 75 Yet the ultimate goals of
these two groups are not the same even if their behavior patterns are
similar. Politicians "attempt to maximize their own self interest" by
getting re-elected, not to make a business profit. 17 6 Thus, attempting
to get good deals for special interest groups who contribute money to
campaigns, and not finding low cost producers, is an economically
rational response to the incentives in the re-election process.1 77 Busi-
nessmen, on the other hand, attempt to maximize their self-interest by
making a profit in order to sustain their business. Re-election, thus,
174 HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 106 (1998).
175 Id.
176 Id. See generally SAM PELTZMAN, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND GOVERNMENT
REGULATION (1998) (discussing the economic theories that try to explain the link
between voting, political decisions, and regulations).
177 SeeJonathan Chait, Money Man, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 23, 1998, at 15 (dis-
cussing Senator Mitch McConnell and his role in blocking campaign finance reform);
see also Sheila Kaplan, Campaign 2000, by the Numbers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan.
18, 1999, at 20, 21 (stating that for the 2000 presidential campaign, "[a] candidate will
need to raise as much as $25 million between now and the end of the year to be
viable. That's nearly $60,000 per day, every single day"). This need for money to fuel
the political process is no new phenomena. As one political historian put it,
"[B] efore business learned to buy statesman at wholesale [in the twentieth century], it
had to buy privileges retail.... A disgruntled Congressman from Ohio declared in
1873 that 'the House of Representatives was like an auction room where more valua-
ble considerations were disposed of under the speaker's hammer than in any other
place on earth.'" RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION & THE
MEN WHO MADE IT 219 (Vintage Books 1974). However, not all politicians have suc-
cumbed to the temptation of trading favors for money. James Madison, "[a] s a matter
of principle, . . . refused to follow the custom of treating the voters to whiskey; it
smacked too much of buying votes," and he was then defeated in his 1777 run for the
Virginia legislature. CARLTON B. SMITH, JAMES MADISON: A BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCH 5 (1995). See generally Symposium, Campaign Finance Reform, 24J. LEGIs. 167
(1998) (discussing the problems of soft money in the political process).
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plays no role in motivating business decisions, while it plays a signifi-
cant, if not dominate, role in making political decisions.
178
Yet, the economics of re-election do not fully explain why polit-
ical actors in Congress behave as they do within the context of voting
and budgetary decisions. "Our best picture of the political process,
then, is a mixed model in which constituent interest, special interest
groups, and ideology all help determine legislative conduct"' 79 This
qualification, however, only serves to bolster the premise that con-
gressmen do not make government purchase or military budgetary
decisions based on profit. They often make military budgeting deci-
sions based on the needs of their constituents.
Recent military budget decisions by Congress exemplify how little
the military procurement process resembles commercial transac-
tions.180 During budget planning, in an unabashed example of pork-
barrel politics, then-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, Representa-
178 "Reelection is the prime motivator of Congress, but remember who elects the
driver is C--equaling constituent, constituent, constituent. Understanding a corpo-
rate constituent's interest will allow you to respond best to the Member." WIBnER D.
JoNES,JR., CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT AND RELATIONS: A GuIDE FOR DF ARTmENT OF
DEFENSE AcQuIsrrION MANAGERS, at x (4th ed. 1996).
179 DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAw AND PuBuc CHOICE: A CRmcAL
INTRODUCrION 33 (1991).
180 Older military purchasing decisions also reflect the influence of Congress and
its preference for constituent jobs when making buying decisions. The M9 Beretta
was a congressionally-directed non-developmental buy. Part of the contract require-
ment for the winning weapon's manufacturer was that the production of the weapon
must transition to the U.S. after two years. Beretta of Italy was awarded the contract.
Since its initial purchase, the Beretta has experienced some breakage problems in its
slide. As an armory officer for his squadron, one of the authors oversaw the require-
ment that his armorers add a strengthening piece to the weapon, a process that re-
quired manpower and material. Although the M9 has a required service life of 7000
rounds, the weapon it replaced, the Colt 1911, had a track record in the 100,000s of
rounds. For more on this, see Wayne Facca, Beretta Horror Stoly (visited Mar. 5, 2000)
<http://www.stokesworld.com/berettastory.html>, U.S. Marine Corp, FactFile: M9Pis-
tol (visited Mar. 5, 2000) <http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/factfile.nsf/htm>, and Firearm
Information by Type (visited Mar. 5, 2000) <http://www.recguns.com/IIIC2b6.htmb.
The manufacturer budget decisions for big ticket items are not the only victims of
congressional self-interest and choice of congressional action that do not reflect com-
mercial profit motive. Defense-related job cuts and military base closures are also
exposed to the vagaries of the political process. One example is the request by Sena-
tors Moynihan and Schumer and Representative Boehlert of New York to meet with
deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamry to discuss job cuts at the Rome Laboratory.
See Officials Ask to Meet on Cuts Planned for Lab, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1999, § 1, at 47.
"The cuts are the result of a shift in Pentagon spending to space-based laser and radar
research." Id. The cuts would reduce the lab's payroll and save the Air Force $5
million. The importance of jobs in a given congressional district and the desire to
take credit for the creation of those jobs is evidenced by the frequency with which
2000] 1455
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
tive from Georgia, attempted to add the purchase of C-130J transport
aircrafts to the budgets for fiscal years 1999 and 2000.181 Lockheed
politicians announce the closure of a contract between the military and a local busi-
ness in the congressman's district.
U.S. Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.) today announced that Dow-United
Technologies Composite Products, Inc., has been awarded $30.2 million in
new contracts to build parts for the U.S. Air Force F-22 next generation air
superiority fighter.
Speaking to employees following a tour of the company's plant here
today, Rep. DeLauro said, "Your work on the F-22 will guarantee that our
nation's Air Force Pilots will fly the best fighter in the air. It makes me
proud to know that people in Connecticut are building such advanced
aircraft."
Wallingford Firm Wins $30.2 Million Contracts: US. Rep. Rosa DeLauro Announces New
Technology to Build Parts for F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter (visited Aug. 10, 1995)
<http://-vw.dowut.com/news0017.htm>.
181 See Elaine M. Grossman, House Speaker Presses Air Force to Procure C-130Js It Does
Not Yet Need, INSmE THE PENTAGON, Sept. 24, 1998, at 1. In fact, the continued exist-
ence of the Georgia facility may be a thorn not only in the taxpayer's side, but also in
the side of Lockheed Martin itself.
The recent resignation of Newt Gingrich as Speaker of the House may
be a Blessing to Lockheed Martin Chairman Vance Coffman. His $28 bil-
lion (1998 Revenues) aerospace giant is carrying an albatross: its 9,600-em-
ployee Marietta, Ga. aircraft plant.
[W] hen you get more than 80% of your business from government or-
ders-from defense, NASA, the U.S. Postal Service and various states-as
Lockheed Martin does, you can't afford to alienate Congress by closing un-
needed plants, since that would eliminate voters' jobs. The sprawling Mar-
rieta plant, mostly leased by Lockheed Martin from the U.S. Air Force, has
long had powerful protectors. First it was Sam Nunn, Georgia senator and
for years chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. After Nunn
stepped down, the protector was Gingrich, whose 6th congressional district
in Georgia lies next to the district where the plant is located and is home to
many of the workers.
Elsewhere in the sprawling empire, Coffman, two years in the top job,
has been an effective cost cutter.... But the cuts have so far fallen lightly on
the Marietta plant. ... Buried deep in the company's third-quarter 1OQ
statement was a notice that the company would take a writedown of $350
million to $400 million ($1.84 to $2.10 a share) in the first quarter of 1999.
The writedown is mostly to cover cost overruns on the latest update of the C-
130 Hercules, which is built in Marietta.
Howard Banks, Blessing in Disguise, FoRBEs, Dec. 28, 1998, at 92-93.
Lockheed Martin Corp., beset by plunging profit and problems across
its product lines, said Friday it is conducting an internal review that could
result in selling or shrinking its core satellite and aircraft manufacturing fa-
cilities in order to cut costs.
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Martin Corporation makes the C-130 transport. The manufacturing
plant is located in Marietta, Georgia and employs large numbers of
Gingrich's constituents.'8 2 None of these aircrafts were requested by
the military and, in fact, the spending increases on this aircraft seem
to go against the desires of the services to spend more money on oper-
ations and maintenance and less on the procurement of new goods.'8 3
Although not all congressional spending decisions are about large
Political resistance to major cutbacks at the Marietta facility, for exam-
ple, may have weakened in recent years as the Georgia delegation's clout
slipped with the departures of Sen. Sam Nunn and Rep. Newt Gingrinch.
Jeff Leeds, Lockheed Martin Looking into Cutting 2 Core Plants, L.A TIMEs, Nov. 13, 1999,
at C1.
182 See id.
183 One source reported,
"The FY-99 [Defense] Authorization Act increases the budget request for
procurement by almost $800 million and includes funding for planes and
ships which are not even in the Future Years Defense Plan, while it reduces
o&m funding by almost $350 million below the FY-99 budget request," Levin
said. "That's what the joint chiefs asked us not to do."
Darcia R. Harris, Hamre Lists Congressional 'Pork' Projects as DOD Prepares Supplemental,
INSIDE THE PENTAGON, Oct. 1, 1998, at 1. This is no single occurrence:
Deputy Secretary of DefenseJohn White noted in a letter to the Democratic
leadership that "many of the proposed increases.., are for systems or pro-
grams which are not included in the departments" five-year plan. And he
warned that those increases will force the Pentagon to divert money from
projects with a higher priority later to stay within the military spending ceil-
ings Congress has set for the end of the decade.
Walter Pincus & Dan Morgan, Defense Budget "Add-Ons" (or Pork and Pet Projects) Manage
to Survive, WASH. POsT, July 19, 1996, at 31.
Indeed, Congress is still deeply mired in Cold War thinking and has perpetu-
ated many Cold War related procurement programs in classic pork-barrel
style. The process has become so entrenched that even when the Pentagon
wishes to terminate obsolete programs, Congress continues to fund them in
order to provide jobs for constituents. In the Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal 1993, Congress saved the V-22 Osprey and the F-16 aircraft programs
from termination, and continued funding upgrade programs for the MIA
tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, and the Apache AH-64 helicopter.
Bischak, supra note 169, at 11, 20.
Ignoring the navy's wishes, two members of the House Armed Services Com-
mittee are pushing to reopen a closed assembly line of Tomahawk Cruise
Missiles in a move that would benefit a company in one of the lawmakers'
districts.
"For members to throw money to their constituents for parochial rea-
sons is an example of politically motivated waste," said retired Rear Adm.
Eugene Carroll.
Support for Missiles the Navy Doesn't Want, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., July 8, 1999, at A6.
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goods like aircraft, the decisions often reflect lobbying by special in-
terest groups who are constituents of certain congressmen.18
4
184 One such situation is as follows:
A new beneficiary of federal defense spending is a small Illinois com-
pany that produces neither weapons nor widgets. It makes chewing gum.
Rep. J. Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) ... slipped in $250,000 in research funds
to study the potential defense uses to Stay Alert [gum].
It turns out, officials said, that the money is destined for a doctor at
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research who will study the effects of Stay
Alert on soldiers.
It also turns out that Stay Alert is a new product of Amurol Confections
Co. of Yorkville, III.-Hastert's hometown.
Col. Gregory Belenky, the psychiatrist who runs the Army's sleep depri-
vation program, said Amurol approached him this summer, and when he
expressed interest, asked what it would cost to test the new gum. He said he
thought the company would foot the bill and was unaware it went to Hastert,
seeking to have the taxpayers pick up the tab.
J.D. Hamilton, chief executive of lockmaker Mas-Hamilton Group in
Lexington, Ky., has had help from his state's congressional delegation for
years in getting federal business for his company.... Defense Department
records show the Pentagon spent more than $50 million to install 121,568
Mas-Hamilton locks in its facilities.
Now, with the help of Rep. Harold Rogers (R-Ky.), a member of the
House Appropriations Committee, $5 million was added to the defense-
spending bill during conference deliberations to start expanding the lock
retrofit to defense contractors as well.
Charles R. Babcock, Pentagon Budget's Stealth Spending: Lawmakers Slip in Special-Interest
Items, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1998, at 1.
At a time when the Pentagon is lamenting a lack of money for key pro-
grams, the annual defense appropriations bill headed toward passage this
fall contains an estimated $4 billion in projects the military never asked
for-programs added on by members of Congress seeking to steer military
spending to their home districts.
Even when the projects have an arguable defense purpose, many of
them reflect only the tenacious agendas of their congressional sponsers.
The defense bill includes more pork projects-known on the Hill as
"earmarked money"-than any other federal spending measure....
In the House version of the fiscal 1999 defense appropriations bill, Rep.
John P. Murtha (D-Pa.) has inserted $25 million in funding for DRS Laurel
Technologies in Johnstown, his hometown.
In six years, stoked by Murtha's clout as the ranking Democrat on the
House defense appropriations subcommittee, DRS Laurel's annual revenue
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Given the incentives of Congress for promoting the purchasing of
various military weapons systems, services, and parts, the FCA stands as
an appropriate response to a situation that contains none of the trap-
pings of the commercial sector. Individual congressmen often have
little reason to scrutinize the military contracts made with defense
contractors from their home districts who provide jobs for constitu-
ents. 8 5 The FCA takes account of this situation by providing an in-
creased incentive for contractors to abide by their contracts and to
ensure the conduct of their employees does not constitute fraud. The
lower burden of proof standard is important because it provides de-
fense contractors with an added incentive to monitor their own activi-
ties. Given the fact that Members of Congress do not have an
incentive to scrutinize defense contractor behavior, the defense con-
has ballooned from $3 million to $70 million and its work force has grown
from 45 to 260. Jack Donnelly, the president of DRS Laurel Technologies,
credits Murtha "100 percent for opening the door" to lucrative Pentagon
business.
Like some of his colleagues, Murtha demonstrates his effectiveness in
press releases touting new money for local enterprises. And the publicity
helps come election time. A power in military spending, Murtha garners his
largest chunk of campaign donations from the defense industry, according
to an analysis by the Center for Responsive Politics.
Charles R. Babcock, Congress Fattens Defense Bill with $4 Billion in Pork: Some Earmarked
Projects Have Little Military Value, Officials Say, WASH. PosT, Aug. 15, 1998, at 1. Other
examples of unrequested military funding are as follows: $79 billion for eight more
UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and $94 million for more two-and-a-half ton trucks than
the Army asked for in the budget, $25 million for unrequested submarine acoustic off
the shelf processors and $12 million for other unrequisitioned DDG 51 Smart ship
equipment for the Navy, and $72 million in advanced acquisition money for E-8C
JSTARS aircraft to the airforce although never requested. SeeJohn Donnelly, McCain:
Senate Defense Bill Contains $2.5 Billion in Pork, DEF. WEEK, June 1, 1998, at 5; see also
Citizens Against Government Waste, 1998 Pig Book: Chapter 10-Military Construction (vis-
ited Nov. 28, 1998) <http://v.govt-waste.org/ publications/pigbook/index.html>.
185 SeeJAMEs P. STEVENSON, THE PENTAGON PARADox: Tl-t DEVELOPMENT OF THE F-
18 HORNET 219 (1993).
If Congress and the Pentagon are about anything, they are about the
acquisition of money-money for military projects to transform colonels
into generals and money to ensure the reelection of senators and congress-
men who funded various military programs. During the ongoing F-18 de-
bates, two of the most powerful men in Congress, Senator Ted Kennedy and
Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill, knew the F-18's engine would be built in
their state of Massachusetts. They were mighty proponents of the F-18, and
pivotal to its acceptance by Congress.
Id. For an extensive discussion of the correlation between defense contractors and
congressional support, see BRucE M. RUssETr, WHAT PRICE ViGIANcE? THr BURDENS
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 56-90 (1970).
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tractor incentive produced by the FCA plays an important part in the
Act's deterrent effect.18
6
Like congressmen, the President is also a creature of politics,
born of constituents' votes and special interest support. Being a crea-
ture of politics, the President is also not immune to the incentives that
motivate politicians. Nixon v. Fitzgerald18 7 stands as an excellent exam-
ple of how politics and not profits motivate presidential decisions
regarding military procurement. A. Ernest Fitzgerald was a manage-
ment analyst for the Department of the Air Force. After testifying
before Congress about "concealed cost overruns and the technical
problems of the giant Lockheed C-5A transport plane,"188 Fitzgerald
was fired from hisjob. Although Fitzgerald got his job back at a later
date, the scandal his comments generated was a huge embarrassment
to the Pentagon and the White House. Documents disclosed during
the investigation "showed explicitly how top Pentagon officials had
conspired to falsify official government records to cover up the C-5A
cost overruns."18 9 Despite his coming forward and revealing these
problems in the program, Fitzgerald was not hailed as an upstanding
citizen by the Nixon White House. Rather, he was referred to as the
guy who "ratted on the C-5A overruns." 190 Fitzgerald's sin was failing
to keep the code of silence with regard to defense contractors and
cost problems. Thus, unlike a businessman motivated by profit and
seeking to maximize efficiency and minimize costs, the White House
was more worried about image and embarrassment, again showing
how little defense procurement decisions mirror private sector busi-
ness purchase decisions and subsequent contract monitoring.
Like Congress and the President, the DOD also plays an essential
role in the purchasing of military weapons and services. And like Con-
gress and the President, the DOD does not operate in an environment
equivalent to that of the private commercial sector.191 The DOD func-
186 Some authorities also argue that "Congress has not the resources, the incen-
tives, nor the organization to review and evaluate each year the thousands of individ-
ual programs that make up the defense posture." BLEcHmAN, supra note 172, at 28.
187 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
188 A. ERNEST FITZGERALD, THE PENTAGONISTS: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF WASTE, MIS-
MANAGEMENT, AND FRAUD IN DEFENSE SPENDING 3 (1989).
189 Id. at 14.
190 Id. at 3.
191 President Harry S. Truman stated,
The thing I've always felt about the Pentagon is that while it was probably
necessary .... it's not right to have all those people in one building without
a single watchdog. There ought to be somebody looking into every penny
that's spent, but there isn't. And we are all in trouble when that goes on,
when the generals get that much power.
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tons, essentially, as a non-profit organization whose budget depends
not on profits from the sale of products or services, but on the deci-
sions of bureaucrats and political appointees. 9 2 The DOD provides a
public good' 93 and the DOD will never go out of business as long as
the nation feels the need to provide itself with some sort of national
defense. Essentially, the DOD is a government-perpetuated monopoly
whose operation is not measured by profits or losses. Thus, the DOD
is not constrained by the "market" or shareholders in its decision mak-
ing processes regarding capital acquisitions, such as procurement of
weapons systems, spares, and services.'
94
DOD bureaucrats make decisions to buy weapons and parts based
on a wide variety of influences, including, but not limited to, the paro-
chial interests of DOD survival, 9 5 such as big defense budgets, 9 6 the
desire for technologically advanced weapons to satisfy a technology
MILLER, supra note 41, at 170 (quoting President Harry S. Truman).
Each of the many organizations [that make up the DOD] seeks to be
"successful," but success for a government agency is not an easily defined or
measured concept. Unlike their business counterparts, government organi-
zations have no product that can be priced and sold for profit on the open
market. A dollar measure can be applied to tanks and airplanes in terms of
cost, but not their final product-national security. Success tends to be mea-
sured indirectly, through surrogate means.
AMOS A. JORDON ET AL., AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURI=. POLICY AND PROCESS 221 (4th
ed. 1993).
192 See generally BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE: THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE (David C. Kozak & James M. Keagle eds., 1988) (discussing the various theories
behind defense procurement decisions and the bureaucratic politics that influence
those decisions).
193 "Public Goods [are goods] that no individual can be excluded from consum-
ing ...." BUTLER, supra note 174, at 932.
194 "The basic reason for the problem [of weapons procurement] is incredibly
simple and will be incomprehensible to anyone who has not spent time in the system:
there is no profit and loss sheet. Thus, there is no competition and incentive to pro-
duce. The goal of every good bureaucrat is to get an exclusive franchise on what he is
doing." Thomas S. Amlie, Defense Acquisition-Some Observations and Suggestions
(unpublished manuscript), quoted inJJAMEs FALLoWs, NATIONAL DEFENSE 63 (1981).
195 "Another bureacratic measure of organizational 'success' is size; a successful
organization is one that is growing, usually in terms of budget and personnel. Organi-
zational growth implies increasing capabilities and greater importance in decision-
making and implementation." JORDON ET AL., supra note 191, at 221.
196 "In too many cases of weapons procurement decisions, organizational survival
is at stake. It is impossible to separate out the competition that goes on concerning
weapons decisions among military services over budget, promotion, approval, and
power." LAUREN HOLLAND, WEAPONS UNDER FIRE 7 (1997). "Each of the services is as
parochial in defending its interests as ever." Id.
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fix, 19 7 and the politics of jobs1 98 and re-appointment. 199 One could
also add DOD's granting of contracts to ensure the continued eco-
nomic viability of certain prime contractors. 200 None of these incen-
tives regarding weapons procurement decisions reflects the model of
the wealth-maximizer used to explain commercial transactions in the
private sector.
201
197 In the case of many weapons systems purchases "technology can substitute for
military need as the original impetus for the conception" of the system. HOLLAND,
supra note 196, at 10.
198 "Careerism is a pervasive force inside the Pentagon. Its symptoms are often
subtle, not blatant." BURTON, supra note 168, at 5.
199 "Behind each weapon is a group of legislators responding to constituent de-
mands, bureaucrats seeking to perpetuate their organization, executive officers react-
ing to governmental pressures, and defense contractors struggling for economic
survival." HOLLAND, supra note 196, at 14.
200 According to one source,
The government, furthermore, has not been adverse to giving special breaks
to [aerospace, communications, and electronics] firms when they get into
trouble, ostensibly on the grounds of preserving the industrial base for na-
tional defense. Between 1958 and 1973 the government undertook some
3,652 rescue operations to help financially troubled firms.... Underlying
such bailouts is a form of economic blackmail, aptly expressed in the quip by
Congressman William Moorhead (D-PA) in 1970, in which he compared
Lockheed's threat of bankruptcy to that of "an 80-ton dinosaur who comes
to your door and says, 'If you don't feed me, I will die.' And what are you
going to do with 80 tons of dead, stinking dinosaur in your yard?"
The Pentagon also attempts to spread around its contracts to ensure the
well-being of its principle contractors. James Kurth calls this practice the
"follow-on imperative," in which big companies get "turns" in being granted
the latest contract in the sequence of new weapons systems. Kurth recently
predicted that Lockheed, which has been having financial difficulties, would
be the next to receive a follow-on contract. In early 1990 the Lockheed-led
team won the bid for the lucrative Advanced Tactical Fighter contract.
Joel Yudken, Economic Development, Technology, and Defense Conversion: A National Policy
Perspective, in REAL SECURrIY, supra note 169, at 41, 49.
201 According to the United States General Accounting Office,
The commercial and defense environments created different incentives and
elicited different behaviors from the people managing the programs. Spe-
cific practices took root and were sustained because they helped a program
succeed in its environment-not because they were textbook solutions. The
success of commercial product developments were determined when pro-
duction units were sold. Until that point, the firms' own money was at risk.
Failure was seen as both clear and painful if the customer walked away. This
definition of success, coupled with the realization that production startup
was relatively close at hand, made production concerns a key factor in pro-
gram start and subsequent decisions and provided strong incentives to iden-
tify risk early and realistically. DOD programs began without needed
technology in hand; rather they were encouraged to include undeveloped
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Traditionally, DOD has focused most of its attention on justify-
ing its need for funding rather than on the outcomes that its pro-
grams produced. DOD generally measures its performance by the
amount of money spent, number of people employed, or number of
tasks completed. Also, incentives for DOD decisionmakers to imple-
ment changed behavior have been minimal or nonexistent.
20 2
DOD managers have little incentive to change behavior:
DOD managers have few incentives to improve the Depart-
ment's financial, acquisition, and infrastructure management ap-
proaches. For example, in DOD's culture, the success of a
manager's career depends more often on moving programs and op-
erations through the DOD process than on improving the process.
The fact that a given program costs more than estimated, takes
longer to complete, and does not generate results or perform as
promised is secondary to implementing the new program.
203
What the present system of procurement within the DOD does
promote is a system in which individuals monitoring the development
and purchase of weapons have very little reason to scrutinize spending
within a weapons program or to root out the fraud that might exist.
20 4
technology. Because these programs ran much longer, production concerns
did not play as big a role and were not critical to success in the early stages.
The definition of success was more complicated in DOD. During most of
production development, success was defined as getting DOD and Congress,
as the customers, to fund the development annually. Optimistic assessments
of performance and cost helped ensure this kind of success; realistic risk
assessments did not.
U.S. GExN. Acr. OFF., GAO/NSIAD-98-56, BEsT PRACrcEs: SuccEssFuL APPLICATION
TO WEAPONs AQCuIsrrxoNs REQUIRES CHANGEs IN DOD's ENVImONMNm 5 (1998) (vis-
ited Feb. 2, 1999) <http://www.fas.org/man/gao/nsiad98056.htm.>. "The pressures
and incentives in the DOD environment explain why the behaviors of managers and
other sponsors of product developments differ from those of commercial programs.
According to a 1994 study done for the Undersecretary for Acquisition, government
program managers found their formal role of objective program management at odds
with their informal role of program advocates." Id. at 36. "A feeling of responsibility
for program advocacy appears to be the primary factor causing government managers
to search aggressively and optimistically for goods news relating to their programs,
and to avoid bad news, even when it means discrediting conventional management
tools that forecast significant negatives deviations from plan." Id.
202 U.S. GEN. AcCr. OFF., GAO/T-NSIAD-97-143, DOD HIGH-RisK AREAs: ELIMI-
NATING UNDERLYING CAUSES WILL AVOID BIoLIONs OF DoLLARs IN WASTE 23 (1997)
(statement of Henry L. Hinton Jr., Assistant Comptroller General, National Security
and International Affairs Division).
203 Id. at 3.
204 According to Burton,
The majority of daily activities inside the Pentagon deal with weapons
system acquisition. Although the public believes the business of the Penta-
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Although not officially designated as a regulatory agency, the DOD
and its subagencies act in a regulatory capacity with regard to purchas-
ing and development decisions. Due to this quasi-regulatory function,
the DOD has, in many instances, succumbed to what is known as "reg-
ulatory capture."
The history of economic regulation shows that industry-specific
regulatory agencies tend to lose sight of their public interest mis-
sion over time. That is, although an agency may be created to con-
trol a particular industry, experience reveals that most regulatory
agencies eventually adopt the perspective of the regulated industry.
This is referred to as regulatory capture. Thus, eventually, the regu-
lated industry frequently benefits from the regulation.
It is not unusual for administrative agencies to act in the inter-
est of the regulated industry rather than the so-called public inter-
est. One explanation that has often been given is that the selection
of board or commission members is biased towards choosing indi-
viduals from the industry.
20 5
gon is defending the nation, its real business is buying weapons. The acqui-
sition community within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, each service,
and Capital Hill dominates the system. The entire process of acquisition, in
turn, is dominated by unchecked advocacy. Many incentives exist for people
to usher in new weapons successfully into the system. The rewards include
promotions, career advancements, and the possibility of high-salaried jobs
with the defense industry after retirement.
Programs for the acquisition of weapons systems are spawned and nur-
tured within this community. Because the incentives and rewards favor suc-
cessful advocacy, there is seldom a serious attempt by the acquisition
community to cancel its own programs.
BURTON, supra note 168, at 111.
205 BUTLER, supra note 174, at 129. For a discussion of the revolving door syn-
drome, see Edna Earle &JassJohnson, "Agency Capture": The "Revolving Door" Between
Regulated Industries and Their Regulated Agencies, 18 U. RicH. L. REV. 95 (1983). There
are rational, economics-based reasons why the public does not affect such processes
and selections: the rationally ignorant voter and the free-rider. Since the tax dollars
lost due to lax regulation may only amount to a few dollars per year per voter, it
makes little sense for voters to spend time on the problem since the money they
would have to expend to get the information and organize to affect the change would
far exceed the amount of money that they would save in taxes each year-thus the
rationally ignorant voter phenomena. The free-rider problem is much more simple;
since the problem affects every tax payer, every taxpayer has the incentive to wait for
someone else to deal with the problem in order not to incur the expenses while reap-
ing all the benefits. See PELTZMAN, supra note 176, at 329 (explaining the theory of
the rational ignorance as it applies to regulations).
The regulated industry has the greatest interest in the rules and regulations
to be promulgated by the agency. Thus, in administrative hearings on pro-
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All the elements of "regulatory capture" exist within the DOD.
Examples abound of administrations appointing defense contractors
to top positions within the DOD, defense contractors that subse-
quently return to positions in companies that the DOD is supposed to
oversee and regulate. Probably the most recent and highly publicized
instance of the revolving door between the defense industry and the
DOD leading to scandal is "Operation m-Wind." Aimed at the corrup-
tion running rampant in the defense industry, this FBI-run sting oper-
ation led to the indictment and conviction of several defense industry
executives, including Melvyn Paisley, a Boeing executive who was the
Assistant Secretary for the Navy in charge of research and engineering
in the Reagan Administration. 2
0 6
posed rule-makings, their perspective is likely to be better articulated than
the public interest. This bias is not surprising, because individual citizens do
not have the incentive to voice their positions on public policy issues because
of the free-rider problems. Thus, there is underrepresentation of dispersed
citizens' interests in the political process in general and the administrative
process in particular.
BUTLER, supra note 174, at 130.
206 See PASZTOR, supra note 158, at 84, 368. It is not uncommon in the defense
industry to encourage executives to work within the Pentagon and DOD.
"[C]ountless civilian Pentagon officials, who had been appointed from the ranks of
defense contractors, conduct themselves as if they were still working for the defense
industry instead of the troops in the field. I have seen ... civilian officials leave
government service and go to work for defense contractors, who benefited from ac-
tions they took before leaving." BURTON, supra note 168, at 66. "As a matter of policy,
Boeing liked to loan fast-rising executives to the government for a couple of years. It
bred good will for the company and demonstrated the high caliber of its people. For
Boeing, the practice also ensured a steady stream of up-to-date intelligence about
what was happening inside the services and the secretary's office." PAszTOR, supra
note 158, at 48-49. Boeing exploited this type of relationship in its Minuteman mis-
sile project with the Air Force through executive Ben Plymale. Plymale had worked
within the DOD from 1968-72, holding "a high-ranking research post in the Penta-
gon, advising the secretary of defense." Id. at 48. The Air Force wanted to retain
control over one leg of the nuclear deterrence triad; ground-based intercontinental
missiles. The Minuteman program gave them the vehicle for doing so in the face of
success of the Navy's submarine launched missiles.
When it came to the Minuteman program, Boeing actually manufac-
tured a very small part of the missiles themselves. But it was hired to put
everything together .... The extraordinary close ties that developed be-
tween the company and the Pentagon on Minuteman became a model for
managing future weapons projects. Boeing and the Air Force has such a
good rapport and understood each other's problems so well, Paisley liked to
joke, that "pretty soon you couldn't see the difference between them." That
symbiotic relationship paid off handsomely. Boeing ultimately collected
nearly half of all Minuteman revenues, becoming the Air Force's favorite
supplier in the process.
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A statement by Dr. Thomas S. Amlie, former Technical Director
at the Naval Weapons Center at China Lake, California, describes the
hazards for fraud and false claims inherent in the defense procure-
ment system:
Nobody cares much what is bought so long as the money gets
spent .... The DOD has all the symptoms of being corrupt, incom-
petent, and incestuous, and is so to an alarming degree. This is not
because of some sinister plot but because the present structure
forces millions of players to act like rational human beings and do
what is necessary for their survival or perceived best interests. Many
of the players are aware that things are going badly and are un-
happy .... They are not, in the main, dishonest or incompetent,
just caught in a very bad situation.
20 7
With this statement in mind, and given the nature of the relationship
between the DOD and present and prospective defense contractors, a
call by FCA critics to create a legal regime that mirrors that used in
the private commercial sector defies logic. The incentive for those
within the DOD bureaucracy to scrutinize every project undertaken is
simply not the same as in the private sector since, unlike the private
commercial sector decision making processes driven primarily by prof-
its, DOD bureaucratic decisions are more often made within political
constraints.
The other important and possibly most influential players in the
military buying game are the separate branches of the military: the
Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Army. The individual services,
like the Congress, the President, and the DOD bureaucracies, have
motives other than profit and loss that drive procurement and buying
decisions: the perpetuation of their own existence being a prime mo-
tivator. These motives cause each service and the individuals within
Id. at 50-51. Another example of a high ranking DOD official coming from the de-
fense industry was then-Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Dr.
Richard DeLauer. Dr. DeLauer was an executive with TRW, Inc., a major defense
contractor. See BURTON, supra note 168, at 118.
The rise of the defense industry and the government's reliance [due to
the advent of the Cold War], to a greater degree than ever before, upon
defense contractors for its weapons needs accompanied the decline of gov-
ernment in-house laboratories, arsenals and shipyards. At the same time,
the traditional dividing line between government and industry was all but
obliterated as high-ranking military and civilian officials shuttled back and
forth between posts in the Pentagon and the defense community, creating
blatant conflicts of interest which [have been] ignored or glossed over.
KAUFMAN, supra note 152, at xv-xvi.
207 Thomas S. Amlie, Defense Acquisition-Some Observations and Suggestions
(unpublished manuscript), quoted in FALLows, supra note 194, at 64.
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those services to make procurement decisions based on what is good
for the integrity and continued existence of the service, and possibly
the advancement of individual careers. 208 Thus, there is little motiva-
tion on the part of the services or personnel within a particular service
to investigate issues of fraud or false claims that mightjeopardize their
longevity.
This desire to extend the life of their particular branch exhibited
by military service men finds various ways to express itself. One of
them is interservice rivalry.2a 9 Several well-documented cases evi-
dence the corrosive force of inter-service rivalry and its deleterious
effects on the buying of weapons for the military.210 A prime example
208 Another observation from President Truman may shed some light as to why
the costs of military projects tend to spiral out of control:
I do know from my experience ... that no military man knows anything
at all about money. All they know how to do is spend it, and they do not give
a damn whether they're getting their money's worth or not. There are some
of them... I've known a good many who feel that the more money they
spend, the more important they are.
That's because of the education they get. I told you. It's like putting
blinders on a man....
So somebody has to keep tabs on the military and all the time, too.
That's the reason our government is set up the way it is.
MILLER, supra note 41, at 164 (quoting President Truman).
The thing I've always felt about the Pentagon is that while it was proba-
bly necessary ... it's not right to have all those people in one building with-
out a single watchdog. There ought to be somebody looking into every
penny that's spent, but there isn't. And we're all in trouble when that goes
on, when the generals get that much power.
ID. at 170. For more insight into this problem, see COLONEL DAVID H. HACRWORTH,
HAzARDous Dtrr' 298-315 (1996) (discussing the tendency of the services to oust
those officers who speak out regarding issues of waste that hurt their service's image
and budget).
209 "Wrote one British observer of his American cousins shortly after World War II,
'The violence of interservice rivalry has to be seen to be believed, and was an appreci-
able handicap in their war effort.'" RIcK A=sON, CRUSADE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
THE PERsIAN GuLF WAR 151 (1993). This rivalry even asserted itself during the Gulf
War. "The Navy and Air Force wrangled about matters both foolish and urgent. The
Navy resented aircraft rules of engagement. . . which discriminated against Navy pi-
lots because they lacked redundant electronic means of distinguishing friend from
foe." Id. "Many Army and Marine strategists believed the Air Force was trying to
prove its worth at a time when one of the service's primary missions-maintaining the
U.S. fleet of intercontinental bombers and land-based nuclear missiles-appeared in-
creasingly obsolete." Id. at 223.
210 Even recent events in Kosovo reflect the deeply imbedded nature of inter-ser-
vice rivalry in the military psyche. "Army and Marine officers grumble that the Air
Force oversold air power. Air Force officers say the air campaign is too limited in
scope and size, with no ground-troops element." A Special Weekly Report from the Wall
146720oo1
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of this inter-service rivalry pushing weapons procurement is the drive
by the Air Force and the Navy to purchase the next generation of
fighter aircraft. Both services believe that it is essential that they deter-
mine the design specifications for their next generation fighter.
These two services both believe that to have the design for an aircraft
imposed on them by a sister military service would undermine the
"loser's" credibility with Congress and possibly jeopardize that ser-
vice's share of the military budget.
211
The debate and fight over acceptance of the F-16 demonstrates
how inter-service rivalry, and not commercial factors like expense,
drive procurement decisions. The concept for the F-16, a small, ma-
neuverable fighter aircraft, was designed outside the Air Force's nor-
Street Journal's Capital Bureau: Finger-Pointing Begins at the Pentagon over Criticism of the
Kosovo Bombing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1999, at Al.
211 The briefing discussed two threats-the "external threat," from the Russians,
and the "internal threat," from the Navy. Its final chart read,
Unless the US Air Force thoroughly studies high performance austere
fighters and is prepared to consider them as a necessary complement to
other air superiority aircraft, the US Air Force may be:
A. Outgamed by the Navy (Again)
"That got [the Air Force's] attention," [Air Force Colonel Everest Riccioni]
said later. "The Air Force doesn't respond to what the Russians do. It reacts
to what the Navy does."
FALLOws, supra note 194, at 102. "Unless the Fighter Mafia [in the Air Force] beat the
navy to the punch, the Air Force would probably wind up with another Navy air-
plane." BURTON, supra note 168, at 17.
This competition concerning aircraft design is nothing new to the Navy and Air
Force. Another example of this competition was the acquisition of the F-4 Phantom
II. Under the direction of then Secretary of Defense McNamara, both services were
forced to accept the F-4. Although the McNamara pushed to have the F-Ill become
the next fighter for the Navy and the Air Force, the Navy successfully thwarted this
effort and acquired the F-14 Tomcat. See STEVENSON, supra note 185, at 55-62.
The Navy [and Air Force are] guilty of similar maneuvers. [The Navy] ac-
cepted the F-14 in spite of the airplane's failure to meet specifications in the
same areas where the F-111B performed better. This is not to suggest the
resurrection of the F-111B or to castigate the F-14. It merely illustrates the
syndrome that services will support projects they initiate and actively destroy
programs they did not. On their own projects, the services will look the
other way if the projects fail to live up to specifications. In fact, they will
change the specifications to conform to the aircraft's performance. The
Navy did this with the F-14 and eventually with the F-18. If the Navy had
sponsored the F-16 design, the Fighting Falcon would be flying off aircraft
carriers today.
Id. at 218. For an in depth look at the inter-service rivalry and controversy surround-
ing the design and purchase of the TFX aircraft, see MOLLENHOFF, supra note 156, at
298-323.
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mal development channels.2 12 Although the Air Force had no desire
to buy or build the F-16 "Fighting Falcon," it felt compelled to test and
ultimately buy the F-16 before the Navy could test a similar fighter and
preempt the Air Force as to the design of this next generation of U.S.
fighter aircraft.
The Navy responded to the F-16 by testing and purchasing the
F/A-18 Hornet. The F-18 design actually lost in a fly-off competition
against the F-16, but the Navy refused to buy an Air Force aircraft.213
In this climate of interservice rivalry, each branch of the service has
little or no incentive to police the behavior of the contractors making
the weapon system that the branch favors for fear that the system will
be canceled.
The culture of procurement teaches officers that there are two
paths to personal survival. One is to bring home the bacon for the
service as the manager of a program that gets its full funding. "Pro-
curement management is more and more the surest path to ad-
vancement" within the military, says John Morse, who retired as a
Navy captain after twenty-eight years in the service. When the cruise
missile was gathering steam in the early seventies, there were two
promising young officers, one in the Air Force and one in the Navy,
212 See FALLows, supra note 194, at 95-106; see also BURTON, supra note 168, at
7-27.
213 The following is an account of this development:
The U.S. Navy announced that it would develop the loser in the Air
Combat Fighter competition, a decision that appeared to be in direct contra-
diction to the congressional will. At the May 2, 1975, news conference, an-
nouncing the decision, Dr. David Potter said, "It is perfectly clear that this
does not meet the language of the Congressional Report, and there is noth-
ing further to be said on that score. We're aware of the fact that the proper
selection for the Navy had this unfortunate property."
Dr. Potter had testified the previous year that neither the YF-16 nor the
YF-17 could be made into a successful carrier-capable Navy fighter. Yet it was
the YF-17 that the U.S. Navy was announcing on May 2 as the winner-well,
not quite. It publicly redesignated the F-17 as the F-18 at the time of the
announcement This redesignation implied a new and different airplane.
By changing the designation, the Navy violated the substance and form of
the directive. The Joint Committee language said that the naval Air Combat
Fighter should be a common airplane with the Air Force Air Combat
Fighter. Furthermore, the navy should make use of "technology and
hardware."
The decision to redesignate the YF-17 as the F-18 had to be one of the
worst public relations blunders of the decade. The navy was saying to Con-
gress, not only do we reject your directions for the common airplane, but we
are going to take the uncommon airplane and make it appear even less
common.
STEVENSON, supra note 185, at 209.
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who were in charge of their respective service's cruise missile pro-
grams. The Navy liked the cruise missile from the start, seeing in it
ways to add more missions to the fleet. The Air Force saw the cruise
missile as a potentially threatening alternative to its plans for a new
bomber, and dragged its heels. The Navy man became an admiral
and directed the combined cruise-missile program when the Navy
and Air Force programs were merged. The Air Force man resigned,
his career in a stall.
21 4
This interservice rivalry fuels another, equally problematic type of
behavior within the military procurement process-lack of serious
oversight by military personnel in charge of projects. There are innu-
merable cases of high ranking military personnel not scrutinizing the
work of defense contractors because those officers identified their ca-
reer advancement with the success of a given project.2 1 5 Since there is
no requirement for a project manager to show a profit or a loss, pro-
ject managers can and have overlooked serious contractor misconduct
in order to ensure project completion.
Perhaps one of the most recent flagrant examples of this type of
systemic behavior within the military project and procurement process
is the story of the A-12 Avenger. The A-12 was to be the replacement
aircraft for the aging A-6, a Vietnam era attack aircraft. With an ad-
vanced version of the stealth technology presently incorporated in the
F-117, the A-12 was touted as an example of cutting edge military avia-
tion advancement.
Almost from the start of the program, however, the aircraft was
beset by cost overruns and performance problems.2 16 Yet senior offi-
cials, both military and civilian, within the Navy overlooked the
problems.21 7 The most extraordinary example of the obfuscation as-
214 FALLows, supra note 194, at 64.
215 "For military officers assigned to the Pentagon, advancement is a function of
how well they help their respective service increase its share of the defense budget."
STEVENSON, supra note 185, at x.
216 A cost analyst for the A-12 program, Deborah D'Angelo, prepared written cost
estimates for the program manager, Navy Captain Elberfeld. She gave Captain Elber-
feld a range of cost estimates and the captain chose continually to use the low-ball
figure in his reports to superiors. In two other instances, he used numbers lower than
those contained in D'Angelo's reports. Other analysts discovered the cost over runs
and were also ignored or their reports supressed. See BURTON, supra note 168, at
219-21.
217 According to Burton,
The investigative staff of the House Armed Services Committee identi-
fied ninety red flags of warning raised by various individuals in the Navy and
OSD between January 1988, when the contract was signed, and 26 April
1990, when [Secretary of Defense] Cheney testified before the committee
that the [A-12] program was on track.
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sociated with the A-12 is the visit by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
to the McDonnell Douglas A-12 manufacturing facility on March 14,
1990.218 With the "A-12 contract call[ing] for the first test flight in
June 1990, just a few months away,"219 Cheney wanted to see the pro-
gram's progress. What Cheney saw, unbeknown to him, but more
than likely known to the program's management, was that "[a]ll the
parts [of the A-12] were broken or had failed acceptance tests. Work-
ers set up the plant floor to look like everything was progressing
normally."2
20
In the end, Cheney canceled the A-12 "complaining that he had
been hoodwinked not only by the contractors but also by the Navy.
'No one can tell me exactly how much more it will cost to keep this
program going, and I do not believe a bailout is in the national inter-
est,' a livid Cheney announced ... ,"221 The program's termination
was the culmination of a project in which "[o]ver $3 billion of the
taxpayers' money was completely wasted, with nothing of any value
received in return."222 In discussing the problems of military program
managers overlooking defense contractor mismanagement in this case
and in general, Chester Paul Beach, deputy general counsel to Navy
Secretary Garrett, referred to this behavior as a "cultural problem."223
There is no reason to believe that the factors which made these offi-
cials choose to respond the way they did are unique to [the Navy].
Indeed, experience suggests they are not. Unless means can be
found to solve this abiding cultural problem, the failures evidenced
... can be anticipated to occur again in the same or similar form.22 4
All of the warnings had been ignored or suppressed by people higher
up the chain of command.
Id. at 218.
218 See id. at 222.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 222-23.
221 PASZTOR, supra note 158, at 127.
222 BURTON, supra note 168, at 232. "Nearly $3 billion was spent [on the A-12],
without a single prototype ever being fully assembled." PAszToR, supra note 158, at
126.
223 BURTON, supra note 168, at 228 (quoting Deputy General Counsel Chester
Beach).
224 Id. (quoting Chester Beach); see also Mark Thompson, A Crash and a Collusion?:
A Defense Contractor May Have Escaped Punishment Because the Marines Depend on It Too
Much, TIME, Sept. 20, 1999, at 40.
Pentagon officials acknowledge that the Cobra's crash-and Bell's role in
it-could complicate the Marines' efforts to keep buying V-22's because of
the doubts it might raise about Bell. "If the Marines come down hard on
Bell, the whole program could be called into question," says Lawrence Korb,
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Other instances of the military supporting the line of the defense
contractor despite evidence of hardware problems occurred during
the recent Gulf War conflict. Tremendous claims were made by the
Army and Raytheon, maker of the Patriot missile. At one point both
were claiming a 100% kill rate for the Patriot against Scud missiles. 225
Yet many insiders questioned the veracity of this kill figure. 226 This
incredible success rate may have prompted Congress to fund even
more research and spending into various military missile defense pro-
grams. Subsequent studies indicate, however, that the claims of the
Army and Raytheon were greatly exaggerated. The actual kill rate of
the Patriot against the Scud missile may have been as low as nine per-
cent.227 Yet, the Army could get little mileage out of publicizing such
a low kill rate; poor performance of a program equates to termination
and loss of budget dollars. "Not until more that a year after the war
would the Army acknowledge that it has 'high confidence' in only ten
Scud kills proclaimed in Israel and Saudi Arabia ... "228
Another aspect of the present military procurement system that
potentially lends itself to abuse is the flow of mid and senior-level mili-
tary officers into the corporate ranks of defense contractors.
The other path that procurement opens leads outside the mili-
tary, toward the contracting firms. To know even a handful of pro-
fessional soldiers above the age of forty and the rank of major is to
keep hearing, in the usual catalogue of life changes, that many have
resigned from the service and gone to contractors: to Martin Mari-
etta, Northrop, Lockheed, to the scores of consulting firms and
middlemen whose offices fill the skyscrapers in Rossyln, Virginia,
across the river from the capital. In 1959 Senator Paul Douglas of
who oversaw Pentagon logistics and personnel during the Reagan
Administration.
Id.
225 See Activities of the House on Government Operations, Performance of the Patriot Missile
in the Gulf War (visited Mar. 5, 2000) <http://www.radix.net/-jcturner/patriot.html>.
226 "In Tel Aviv and at the Israeli embassy in Washington, [the patriots' kill rate]
was known as 'the Patriot bullshit.' American claims were based largely on faith and
wishful thinking." ArlINSON, supra note 209, at 278. "On February 4 at the defense
ministry headquarters in Tel Aviv, Major General Avihu Ben-Nun, commander of the
Israeli air force, confronted Colonel Lew Goldberg, head of the Pentagon's Patriot
Management cell. 'The Patriot doesn't work,' Ben-Nun declared bluntly. Of the
twelve Scud-Patriot engagements analyzed by the Israelis, at most three warheads had
been destroyed." Id.
227 Id; see also ATKINSON, supra note 209, at 538. But see Center for Sec. Pol'y, More
"Patriot Games": Government Ops. Committee Discredits Patriot Critics, Cancels Report on Mis-
sile's Performance (visited Mar. 5, 2000) <http://www.security-policy.org/papers/1992/
92-D124.html> (contesting the low kill rate of the Patriot).
228 ATNSON, supra note 209, at 278.
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Illinois reported that 768 retired senior officers (generals, admirals,
colonels, and Navy captains) worked for defense contractors. Ten
years later Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin said that the
number increased to 2,072.229
This situation is unlike any that exists in the private commercial
sector. In the military procurement setting, those individuals respon-
sible for enforcing a given contract are subsequently looking to get a
job from the very company that must fulfill the contract. 23 0 No law
prohibits officers from going to work for the defense contractors they
were once responsible for monitoring. The potential for abuse is pal-
pable. In other government contexts, the problem of undue influ-
229 FALLoWs, supra note 194, at 64-65 (footnotes omitted).
For the military, especially, the prospect of a plush revolving-door retire-
mentjob gives the coalition [of defense contractors and political appoin-
tees] a real hold on all but the most principled and selfless officers. Most
are pushed out of the service in their mid-forties by the up-or-out system,
and they need jobs for that expensive phase of life, what with growing fami-
lies and staggering college costs ahead. They need good jobs, and the door
at Defense Boondoggle Systems, Inc. (DBS) is open.
FrrzoGaxuD, supra note 188, at 289; see also SENATOR WILLIAM PROXMIRE, REPORT FROM
WASTELAND 151 (1970).
[O]ne of the most dangerous and shocking aspects of the military-industrial
complex is the ease with which military officers retire and move into bigjobs
in the defense industries. It matches the way in which high-ranking civilians
in defense or defense-related industries move into the Pentagon-and out
again into industry. There is, in fact, an active, ever-working, fast-moving,
revolving door between the Pentagon and its big suppliers.
Id at 151-52. For the number of former, high-ranking officers working for large
defense contractors in the late 1960s, see id. at 154-55.
230 Recent examples of this abound. In March, 1998, General Dynamics elected
U.S. Army General George A. Joulwan to its board of directors. Joulwan was the Com-
mander in Chief, United States European Command. See General George A. Jouwan
Joins General Dynamics Board (visited Mar. 6, 1998) <http://www.gd.com>. General
Richard D. Heamey, United States Marine Corp, former commanding general, 2d
Marine Aircraft Wing, is now Managing Director of a division of McDonnell Douglas.
Admiral David E. Jeremiah, United States Navy, is President and CEO of Technology
Strategies and Alliances. General Robert Ris Cassi, U.S. Army, is Vice President of L-3
Communications Corp. and Lockheed Martin Corp. See General Dynamics, The Na-
tional Defense Panek Conflict of Interest Doesn't Get Any Clearer Than This (visited Nov. 24,
1998) <http://ww.pogo.org/mici/products/ndp.htm>. All of these officers have
outstanding credentials, but they also used and were responsible for monitoring the
weapons systems made by the contractors they now work for in the civilian world.
The author, himself, has personal experience with this crossover problem. After
leaving the Marine Corps, he was immediately hired by the company which made and
serviced the aircraft he did research and development work on while in the Marines.
He was recruited by another former marine officer who also worked on the aircraft
before leaving the service.
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ence and the appearance of undue influence in such circumstances
prompted Congress to enact laws to account for the possibility and
perception of abuse.23 1
Nothing in the preceding paragraphs describing the incentives
for Congress, the Executive branch, the DOD, or the Armed Services
and their members is meant to imply a great degree of corruption on
the part any of these institutions or their members. The preceding
paragraphs do indicate, however, that none of these institutions nor
their members have the same incentives to monitor contracts for
fraud committed by defense contractors as commercial parties do in a
profit based commercial transaction. One author accurately describes
the situation as such:
There is nothing wrong with congressmen acting this way. Our sys-
tem of government is built on this play of local interests in Con-
gress; but from the perspective of the national interest in an
efficient defense posture, there is a price to be paid for the
supremacy of parochial interests in congressional decision
making. 23
2
We want our congressmen to protect our local interests, and one
of those interest is bringing jobs to a local area; be it through highway
construction or defense related industries. Getting a defense com-
pany indicted for fraud may help the nation as a whole, but it does
little to put food on the plate of one's constituents.
Likewise, we want our military leaders and services to take pride
in their respective services. This enhances esprit de corps, service soli-
darity, and morale. Good morale wins wars, the primary objective of
any military force. The problem lies in the fact that this type of incen-
tive structure may lead the different military services and the DOD to
promote rivalries that are self-serving and destructive in terms of polic-
ing fraud in defense contracts. If a service feels its lifeblood and fu-
ture existence depend on successful defense projects, what incentive
231 The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was designed to prevent former govern-
ment officials now acting as lobbyists from using their connections to influence their
former employers. See Ethics in Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VII, 92 Stat.
1864 (1978) (codified in part as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1994 & Supp. III
1997)). According to the Senate report on the Act, "[The Act and its amendments
are] an attempt to prevent corruption and other official misconduct before it occurs,
as well as penalizing it once it is uncovered." S. REP. No. 95-170, at 30, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4247; see also Matthew T. Fricker & Kelly Gilchrist, Case Com-
ment, United States v. Nofziger and the Revision of 18 U.S.C. § 207: The Need for a New
Approach to Mens Rea Requirements of Federal Criminal Law, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 803
(1990) (discussing the problems that resulted in the amendments of the law).
232 BLEcHMAN, supra note 172, at 56.
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does it have for aggressively rooting out failures and fraud? Obviously
not the same incentive that a commercial company has to root out
fraudulent conduct by the other party to a commercial contract. A
commercial entity must make money to survive. A military service and
a DOD office do not have to show a profit. They must prove they are
viable entities, a viability demonstrated by big budgets and good
projects, not by policing public programs tainted with fraud.
Although critics assert that the fundamental assumptions about
participants in the procurement process have changed, from that of
"government purchasing agencies lack[ing] sufficient incentives to
identify and prosecute contractor misconduct" 233 to a sympathetic
view of DOD officials, 234 they fail to show how the system has actually
changed. The incentives, described above, operating on the govern-
ment procurement agents still exist in the '90s, and assumptions aside,
nothing dramatic about the DOD procurement system has changed
since the '80s. Although critics state that "[t]he 1990s reforms reject
the view of DOD procurement officials as being routinely captured by
the industry and therefore prone to make contracting choices that
systematically favor suppliers at the expense of taxpayers," 235 they pro-
vide no evidence to support these assumptions. What emerges from
the data depicted in this Article is that the DOD procurement process
is still beset by an incentive structure that favors less policing and de-
terrence of fraud than a similar commercial procurement transaction.
Simply stated, the military procurement system, serving as a proxy
for the government procurement system in general, looks nothing
233 Kovacic, A Deterrent, supra note 4, at 207.
234 See id. at 207-209. Not all economists have adopted this belief about a funda-
mental change of opinion regarding the motivations of bureaucrats.
Although there are no doubt selfless civil servants and politicians concerned
with the public good, not all individuals are selfless, and it may be more
realistic to assume that individual actors within the public sector are as con-
cerned with their self-interest as those in the private sector. Self-interest may
be focused on survival, on promotion, on re-election, or on other rewards.
On occasion, these achievements are consistent with good technocratic anal-
ysis like carrying out an appropriate cost-benefit analysis and correctly sizing
and placing a damn. But on other occasions, the decision-maker may well
attempt to minimize social cost of a given activity subject to winning reelec-
tion, or possibly to maintaining or at least avoiding diminution of chances
for promotion.
Anne 0. Krueger, Government Failures in Development, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 9 (1990), re-
printed in PAUL B. STEPHAN III ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BusINEss AND ECONOMICS 605,
607 (2d ed. 1996).
235 Id. at 208. For an example of this very debate, see DefenseLink, U.S. Department
of Defense, DOD News Briefing (visited Aug. 22, 1998) <http://wvw.defenselink.mil/
news/May1995/#briefings>.
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like that of private sector commercial parties. Due to the character of
the institutions involved in the procurement process, the incentives
and influences that shape the contracting with and monitoring of de-
fense contractors by Congress, the DOD, and the individual military
services do not mirror those in the private sector. Thus, laws like the
FCA should reflect the existing and very different environment of the
military procurement world and not that of the commercial sector.
Given the lack of incentives on the part of government defense pro-
curement actors to monitor contractors for potential fraud with the
same vigor as their commercial counterparts, the FCA should provide
an increased incentive for contractors to monitor themselves.
V. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND SURVEY OF THE FCA
The objective of the FCA is to protect the public from being de-
pleted of resources through fraud and false claims on the federal gov-
ernment. Yet critics of the Act assert that the statute does just the
opposite. They insist that enforcement of the FCA actually costs the
federal government more than the government recovers through FCA
suits and settlements. To substantiate this assertion, critics turn to
economic analysis to prove that the costs of enforcement outweigh the
benefits. What the critics do not account for in their economic analy-
sis is the fact that the government participants are not motivated by
profit. Since the government side of a procurement deal is not moti-
vated by profit, the incentive structure in government procurement
transactions is altogether different from that of complete private sec-
tor transactions. Given the faulty premise of the critics' analysis, that
government deals contain the same incentive structure as private
deals, the critics' economic analysis is off the mark.
In order to show where the critics go wrong, it is necessary to
define and explain several economic principles. First, economics
shows "how incentives influence behavior. '236 With the supply of re-
sources finite, human choices are constrained: no one can have every-
thing he or she wants; a person must chose between competing
desires given his or her income or wealth. Income influences a per-
son's choices. Second, "laws... affect incentives," 237 and because laws
affect incentives, they can and do change human behavior by altering
the incentives. Since all humans do not live under exactly the same
conditions and constraints, laws will affect behavior in varying de-
grees-that is, those whose incomes are large may not be deterred
from speeding if it saves them time and allows them to do more work
236 BUTLER, supra note 174, at 3.
237 Id.
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at a high rate of income despite a potentially large ticket, while those
with lower incomes may not speed. Thus, despite the existence of a
law or regulation, some individuals may continue to participate in the
prohibited activity if they would lose more by stopping the activity
than they lose from continuing it.
Since a change in a law will affect the behavior of some individu-
als more than others, economists speak of such changes as affecting
people at the margins. "The basic marginal analysis decision-making
rule is that if the marginal benefit of an activity is greater than the
marginal cost of an activity,"238 a person should chose to continue the
activity. This prediction of behavior assumes that people act in their
rational self-interest by attempting to maximize their own utility.
These economic principles lead to the conclusion that if the govern-
ment wants an economically efficient law, it must create a law that
generates a marginal dollar of benefits for every marginal dollar of
costs. Or, in economic terms, the marginal benefit of the law should
equal its marginal cost.
If efficiency is the goal of a law, then the law should strive for
optimal deterrence.23 9 Optimal deterrence exists when the law pro-
scribing certain conduct does not cost society more than society gains
from the law's implementation. Commentators have pointed to three
areas which constitute the costs of illegal activity: "(1) the [social]
costs imposed by the conduct itself; (2) the costs of detecting and ap-
prehending suspected violators and of establishing their guilt; and (3)
the costs of imposing sanctions. An ideal legal system would minimize
the sum of these three costs."
240
Critics of the FCA state that instead of reducing such costs, the
Act actually increases the costs. They contend that the increase in the
costs is the result of overdeterrence. 241 Overdeterrence in this situa-
tion occurs when too many potential contractors decline to engage in
government contracting for fear of being civilly prosecuted under the
FCA. They argue that this reduction in the number of contractors
lessens competition, thereby driving up the prices of goods, lowering
238 Id. at 5.
239 This goal is not without its critics. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84
CoLuM. L. REV. 1523 (1984); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84
MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985); Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the
Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REv.1265, 1265 (1998) (arguing that an efficiency standard
reduces the law to nothing more than a "pricing scheme" for non-compliance).
240 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1989)
(footnotes omitted).
241 Overdeterrence is a cost of the first type.
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the quality of goods, and thus costing the government more than it
would pay if competition for government contracts were greater.
To support this conclusion, critics point to anecdotal evidence of
overdeterrence. "Anecdotal evidence suggests that the threat of False
Claims Act liability has already driven some firms out of government
contracting, and has caused others to isolate their government con-
tracts business in separate divisions."242 This instance fails to support
the critics concerns for several reasons. First, the critics inaccurately
describe the entire circumstances surrounding the financial problems
of one contractor sued under the FCA. Second, the critics fail to
point out the equally plausible and more likely reason why companies
separate their divisions. Third, the critics do not address one of the
concepts regarding deterrence, that of pricing deterrence properly
both as to the likelihood of the plaintiff's success in litigation and the
damages that might accrue. Finally, recent defense contractor data
does not support their contention that contractors are leaving govern-
ment contracting in droves.
A. Why the Critics' Anecdotal Data Doesn't Translation 243 Well
To support the assertion that the FCA costs taxpayers money, crit-
ics point to anecdotal evidence, two relatively recent cases and a sur-
vey, and then apply an economic analysis to this data to support the
claim of contractor overdeterrence. 244 The critics, however, either fail
to provide all the relevant data or fail to apply economic analysis to
data that does not support their argument.
The case of United States v. Data Translation, Inc.245 stands as the
centerpiece of the critics' arguments against the FCA as it is presently
structured. In 1983, Data Translation, Inc. (DTI), a high-tech firm,
entered into a government contract to sell computer boards to the
government.246 The contract, a Multiple Award Schedule (MAS) con-
tract, replaced the way that the federal government had previously
purchased products from DTI.24 7 An MAS style contract is analogous
to an option in that it stipulates a price for the product but not a
242 An Obstacle, supra note 4, at 3-4; see also DUNBAR, supra note 4, at 1-3. "Every
company I represent in an FCA case vows to get out of government business as quickly
as possible." Fax from attorneyJohn T. Boese to John Terrence A. Rosenthal (Feb. 3,
1999) (on file with author).
243 See United States v. Data Translation, Inc., 984 F.2d 1256 (1st Cir. 1992).
244 See generally DUNBAR, supra note 4; Kovacic, A Deterrent, supra note 4; An Obsta-
cle, supra note 4.
245 984 F.2d 1256 (1st Cir. 1992).
246 See id at 1257.
247 See id. at 1258.
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requirement for the government to purchase the product.248 As a re-
sult of the contracting negotiations, the MAS in this case "permitted
DTI to sell its boards... to government agencies at DTI's ordinary list
price less a four percent discount, provided that the ordering [govern-
ment] agency placed orders for no more than ten items at any one
time."249 The contract also included a reference to the seller's "Certif-
icate of Established Catalogue or Market Price," a document that con-
tained language stating "that DTI certifies that all 'data submitted' are
'accurate, complete and current.'"250
In October 1989, the government brought suit under the FCA,
one of two claims in this case, because DTI did not reveal to the GSA
that DTI offered discounts to particular customers under two different
plans: one for "Special Price Customers," and another regarding "Vol-
ume Purchase Agreement[s]." 251 The complaint alleged that DTI
had presented 386 false claims at a cost of $439,414 to the Govern-
ment.252 After hearing the evidence on the breach of contract claim
and the FCA claim, the district court directed a verdict for DTI
on the breach of contract claim,253 and the jury found DTI
had not violated the FCA. 25 4 The Government appealed both rul-
ings.25
5
The Government's FCA appeal related to the judge's jury instruc-
tion regarding the FCA's knowledge requirement. The Government
argued that the state of mind requirement of the FCA included "not
only 1) a specific intent to deceive, but also 2) 'deliberate ignorance
of the truth,' and 3) 'reckless disregard of the truth.'"256 The First
248 See id.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 1259.
251 Id.
252 See DuNBAR, supra note 4, at 2.
253 The critics misinterpret the judge's decision in the case when they state that
"then-appellate court judge, now-Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer concluded
'that no reasonable jury could have found that DTI. .. violated the False Claims
Act.'" DtrtNaR, supra note 4, at 2. What Justice Breyer did write was that given the
facts, the district court's decision to direct a verdict for DTI on the Government's
breach of contract claim was correct since in the First Circuit's estimation, no reason-
able jury could have found for the Government on the contract claim. See United
States v. Data Translation, Inc., 984 F.2d 1256, 1266 (1st Cir. 1992). The Court stated
clearly that it would not apply the 1986 amendment's knowledge standard retroac-
tively, a question that had nothing to do with a reasonable finding by the jury, but
with the proper jury instructions as to the Government's burden of proof standard.
See id.
254 See id. at 1257.
255 See id.
256 Id. at 1266.
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Circuit, following the lead of the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Mur-
phy,257 declined to retroactively apply the FCA's amended 1986
"knowledge" standard to DTI.2 58 The Court went on to state that it
"need not decide the matter definitely, however .... [since] any error
was 'harmless.' ' 259 The Court's decision not to apply the FCA's
amended "knowledge" standard to DTI in this case should come as no
surprise given the antipathy of federal courts to the retroactive appli-
cation of amended statutes.
260
Critics of the FCA point to several factors in the DTI case as sup-
port for their proposition that the FCA's burden of proof standard is
an inappropriate one. First, critics point to the fact that upon comple-
tion of the suit, DTI left the government contracting business. 26'
They contend that DTI's leaving the government contracting business
is an indication of how the FCA, and the threat of an FCA suit, may
tend to drive firms out of the government contracting arena, thus low-
ering the supply of goods and driving up prices for those goods. Sec-
ond, the price of DTI's stock "fell by nearly 30 percent" upon
initiation of the suit, and DTI's stock price never regained its pre-suit
price even after the company's "legal vindication." 262 Critics attribute
this loss almost wholly to "the reputational effect of the lawsuit."263
These two reasons, in addition to others, provide the critics with grist
for their anti-FCA mill. Yet, these reasons bear some examination, for
what they purport to prove does not seem to measure up under
scrutiny.
First, the DTI story is a bit more complex then the critics let on.
A look at the stock price of the company prior to the initiation of the
law suit or the publicly released information concerning the indict-
ment shows a company in trouble. Between mid-1987 and August
1989, the month DTI reported the FCA suit, the company's stock
price had fallen from approximately twenty-five dollars per share to
less than fifteen dollars per share and was on a downward trend at the
257 937 F.2d 1032, 1038 (6th Cir. 1991).
258 See Date Translation, 984 F.2d at 1266.
259 Id. at 1267.
260 "Retroactivity is not favored in the law... [and] congressional enactments and
administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their lan-
guage requires this result." Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208
(1988). For a brief discussion of the history of the jurisprudence of retroactivity, see
Michael S. Rafford, Note, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Retroactive
Application of the RICO Amendment, 23J. LEGis. 283, 285-93 (1997).
261 See generally An Obstacle, supra note 4.
262 DUNBAR, supra note 4, at 2.
263 Id. "Regardless of a lawsuit's outcome . . . defendants suffer reputational
harm .... " An Obstacle, supra note 4, at 16.
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time of the suit's announcement.26 Earnings had dropped in 1988
from the previous year, and the company had announced in July,
1989, that it was cutting its work force by nineteen percent to control
costs. 265 Not quite the picture of the booming success destroyed by
the FCA suit critics would have one believe. In fact, the deterioration
of DTI's stock price may have little to do with the company's FCA suit,
and everything to do with selling a noncompetitive product, resulting
in poor earnings performance and poor stock performance.
Second, the argument about reputational harm of an FCA suit
goes against some theories and actual experience. The efficient mar-
ket hypothesis states that "capital markets instantaneously and fully
reflect, in an unbiased manner, all economically relevant information
regarding a security's prospective risks and returns."2 66 That is, the
price of a stock reflects investors' beliefs in a company's future profit-
ability. Although controversial, studies seem to suggest that the price
of stock does reflect information about the company.2 67 Critics of the
FCA state that although DTI was vindicated, the price of its stock
never returned to pre-suit value because of the reputational effects of
the charges. 268 This seems to fly in the face of the efficient market
hypothesis. As stated previously, the reputational harm theory as ap-
plied to DTI fails to account for the fact that DTI was not making
money and that poor earnings were actually the reason the stock price
stayed low! In addition, the critics do not explain why these reputa-
tional effects have not hit other contractors like Boeing, McDonnell
Douglas, and others who have had several FCA claims brought against
them, lost those claims, and yet whose stock price has done exception-
ally well.269
264 See STANDARD & PooR's CORP., STANDARD & POOR'S STOCK REPORTs: OVER THE
CoUNTER 3661G (Dec. 1989).
265 See id.
266 BUTLER, supra note 174, at 841.
267 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
cieny, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
268 See DUNBAR, supra note 4, at 2.
269 Lockheed Martin was the number one defense contractor in 1998, the third
year in a row. It has been on the other end of several FCA suits and yet is still in the
defense contracting business. See Market Saavy for 3rd Year, Lockheed Martin Tops Penta-
gon's Defense Contractor List, LA. Tvmss, Feb. 6, 1999, at C3. General Dynamics, the
number three defense contractor, reported a 14% rise in its 1998 earnings despite
being the subject of several FCA suits over the years. For further discussion, see S.
REP. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267 ("In 1985, the
Department of Defense Inspector General, Joseph Sherlick, testified that 45 of the
100 largest defense contractors, including 9 of the top 10, were under investigation
for multiple fraud offenses.").
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It should be noted that small firms, like DTI, may be more likely
to engage in fraudulent practices and thus are in greater need of scru-
tiny, not less. A recent report on the financial reporting of U.S. com-
panies suggests that smaller firms, companies with less than $100
million in assets, committed a significant amount of financial state-
ment fraud,2 70 an activity analogous to submitting false claims. With
this in mind, a legal regime designed to deter fraud should provide
these small companies an extra incentive not to commit fraud.
Third, deterrence must account for the damages the plaintiff sus-
tains and the risk that a defrauder will be caught and successfully
sued. Deterrence, in economic terms, reflects the idea that if the
amount of potential for loss under a certain course of action multi-
plied by the risk of the loss occurring outweighs the amount of the
potential benefit multiplied by the likelihood of realizing the benefit,
then a person should not and rationally will not engage in the activity.
If the activity benefits society more through people pursuing it than
society loses from people pursuing it, then any rule change which
causes individuals to leave the activity may actually cost society even
though less fraud is committed. This is the idea of overdeterrence:
that a given activity has decreased too much due to changes in the law
that raise the costs of the activity. Critics point to the FCA as having
this effect on potential and actual government contractors.
What the critics do not address is the fact that deterrence should
account for several things: (1) the gains through fraud obtained by
the defendant, (2) the likelihood of being caught, and (3) the likeli-
hood of the plaintiff succeeding in the suit. The latter two are not
unitary, meaning that the chance of them happening are not one
hundred percent certain. In fact, the nature of the government pro-
curement setting in general, and the military procurement system in
particular, assures that the second element of the equation will be a
percentage much lower than one hundred percent. That is because
often false claims submitted to the government are carelessly or con-
scientiously overlooked by the government body responsible for scru-
tinizing the contract. Like a civil RICO cause of action requiring a
preponderance standard for treble damages, the FCA should have the
same to properly deter false claims.
270 See MARK S. BEASLEY ET AL., COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE
TREADWAY COMMIssION, FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 1987-1997: AN ANALYSIS
OF U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES 1-7 (1999); Elizabeth MacDonald &Joann S. Jublin, SEC
May Put Small Firms in Audit Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1999, at A2 ("[A] new study of
more than 200 corporate-fraud cases brought by the SEC between 1987 and 1997
found that most financial statement fraud is committed by companies with tiny mar-
ket capitalizations and less than $100 million in assets and revenue.").
1482 [VOL. 75:4
CLEAR AND CONVINCING TO WHOM?
Because frauds are concealable, trebling is important to produce
proper incentives. If perpetrators pay what they took when they get
caught, and keep the proceeds the rest of the time, then fraud is
profitable. If victims recoup only what they lost, and face the bur-
dens and uncertainties of the legal process plus the costs of their
own counsel, then victory will not make them whole, and the
shortfall may mean that victims will not vigorously investigate and
litigate. Trebling addresses both halves of this equation.
2 7'
The rationale underlying Judge Easterbrook's decision supports the
FCA based on the findings of Congress as indicated by the report
below:
Fraud is perhaps so pervasive and, therefore, costly to the Gov-
ernment due to a lack of deterrence. GAO concluded in its 1981
study that most fraud goes undetected due to the failure of Govern-
ment agencies to effectively ensure accountability on the part of
program recipients and Government contractors. The study states:
For those who are caught committing fraud, the chances of be-
ing prosecuted and eventually going to jail are slim .... The
sad truth is that crime against the Government often does
pay.2
72
In addition to the aforementioned criticisms of the FCA, critics
also point to the division of Litton Industries and imply that the divi-
sion was motivated by an attempt to limit the company's liability expo-
sure after it settled an eighty-two million dollar FCA case.273 The
conclusion critics wish to draw is that companies, faced with the possi-
bility of FCA lawsuits, are forced to act inefficiently when doing gov-
ernment contracting. The more plausible reason for the Litton spin-
off, however, is the desire of the Litton Chairman, Alton Brann, to
increase shareholder value. The spin-off of the Western Atlas division
allowed the market to more accurately value the assets of both Atlas
and Litton. This valuation play has little or nothing to do with the
FCA, but everything to do with under-valued stock prices hurting a
company and investors.
274
Another plausible reason for separating a company's government
contracts business from its commercial business is the desire to keep
the incentive system present in the government contracting arena
271 Mosler v. S/P Enters., Inc., 888 F.2d 1138, 1143-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (citation
omitted) (discussing the deterrent effect of treble damages).
272 S. REP. No. 99-345, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CAN. 5266, 5268
(quoting a GAO Report).
273 See An Obstacle, supra note 4, at 4.
274 For more information on the spin off of Western Atlas, see Christopher Pal-
meri, Divide and Prosper, FoRBEs, Nov. 21, 1994, at 118.
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from influencing the individuals who operate in the commercial
arena. As noted by one critic of the military procurement system, "To
the [large] extent that the DOD performs non-competitive procure-
ment, it forces industry into the same habits. Indeed, the large corpo-
rations have to separate those divisions which do business with the
Government from those in the competitive market because of the cor-
rupting. '275 Thus, the possibility of FCA suits may have nothing to do
with the decision of commercial contractors to keep their government
and commercial divisions separate. Much more important in that de-
cision may be the desire to keep the commercial division's personnel
focused on efficiency and not on abiding by the labyrinth of govern-
ment regulations that exist in the government procurement sector.
Instead of focusing attention on reworking the legal regime that
deters fraud, critics ought to be worried about the mounds of regula-
tions which seem to be the real culprit in government procurement
inefficiencies.
Thus, as shown above, despite the desires of critics to paint every
seemingly negative happenstance to a company with an FCA brush,
the facts suggest otherwise.
B. Overdeterrence: What the Numbers Really Say
Because the FCA's burden of proof standard lowers the threshold
for plaintiffs winning FCA suits, critics, using marginal analysis, con-
clude that the statute is an overdeterrent, keeping potential contrac-
tors out of the market and causing existing contractors to leave the
market. Although critics concede in certain instances that "there is
little empirical evidence on the impact of the False Claims Act,"2 76 and
that Professor Kovacic "presents no quantitative data to support his
thesis, his point that the False Claims Act lessens competition by re-
ducing the number of vendors is theoretically sound."
277
Theoretically, the conclusion is sound. It follows the principle of
marginal analysis, that changes in rules or laws will affect behavior at
the margins. However, the statements by the critics that there is little
empirical data is not accurate. There is a body of data on the number
of defense contractors awarded contracts starting in 1966 to the pres-
275 FALLows, supra note 193, at 64 (quoting T.S. Amlie, Defense Acquisition-
Some Observations and Suggestions (unpublished manuscript)).
276 DUNBAR, supra note 4, at 3.
277 Id. at 21. There is another plausible explanation, other than the FCA lower
burden of proof, for the decrease in commercial contractors making contracts with
the government; the shrinking level of government influence on the economy as a
whole. See Kathy Chen, Pentagon Finds Fewer Firms Want to Do Military R&D, WAU. ST.
J., Oct. 22, 1999, at A20.
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ent, and this data does not support the critics' conclusions. To see if
their assumptions are correct, one need only look at the data regard-
ing the number of contractors engaged in government work to get a
sense of whether or not the assumption of contractor flight is war-
ranted. Using the number of contractors in the military procurement
field as a proxy, the critics' drastic marginal analysis assumption does
not appear to hold up.278 In 1986, the DOD employed 34,267 prime
contractors, prime contractors being those firms that obtained direct
contract awards of over $25,000.279 Although the number of prime
contractors sustained a decrease through 1989, to a low of 28,220,20
in 1990 the number of prime contractors began to rise. By 1996, the
number of prime contractors doing DOD work stood at 37,406, ex-
ceeding the number of prime contractors employed by the DOD in
1986. The following year the number decreased to 37,071.281 It is
important to note that the net increase in the number of prime con-
tractors occurred during and despite a period of declining defense
budgets, 282 which could lead one to conclude that there is actually
more competition in the defense contracting arena than there was
prior to the FCA's amendment in 1986.
What this data suggests is that the cries of the critics regarding
the deterrent effect of the FCA may be overblown. Although marginal
analysis does suggest that a decrease in the burden of proof standard
will induce some contractors to leave government contracting and
some never to begin government contracting, the actual numbers are
minimal and the increase in prices and lowering of quality inconse-
quential if not undetectable. It is difficult for the critics to argue that
the Act was not overdeterring prior to 1986, with 34,000 defense con-
tractors, but that it is overdeterring in 1998, with 34,000 defense
contractors.
278 Given the fact that almost half the FCA suits filed each year relate to military
contractors, this proxy seems appropriate. See infra 1488 app. B (containing a chart
graphically displaying the number of military contractors doing business with the gov-
ernment from 1966-98).
279 See Fax from Washington Headquarters Services Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports to John Rosenthal, Federal Practice and Procedure Editor,
Notre Dame Law Review 2 (Feb. 11, 1999) (on file with author).
280 See id at 8.
281 See Number of DOD Prime Contractors with Awards of $25,000 or More by Types of
Business (visited Apr. 21, 2000) <http://webl.whs.osd.mil/peidhome/protrend/
prochist/typebus.htm>.
282 See infra 1487 app. A.
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C. Conflicting Surveys
The critics hold up the results of a small survey as proof of their
claim that the FCA has an insidious effect on the costs of goods and
services procured by the government.28 3 Several other surveys of
much larger magnitude contradict the conclusions of the critics. In
one survey, defense contractors cited six primary areas in which gov-
ernment procurement practices impose significant burdens requiring
the contractors to fundamentally alter the way they do business.
28 4
None of the areas cited by the contractors included mention of the
FCA as a significant impediment.
In another survey done by the DOD regarding firms doing com-
mercial and government contract work, the survey indicated that the
two major reasons for the increased costs for the government were
DOD's quality assurance standards and the Truth In Negotiations
Act.2 85 The study mentioned nothing about the FCA. The Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conducted a recent study
and concluded that four areas of legislation and regulation by the gov-
ernment cause significant differences between government con-
tracting and commercial contracting.2 86 As in the other surveys,
military specifications and standards, as well as unique federal con-
tracting requirements, were deemed the culprits. Nothing seemed to
indicate that the FCA was a major or even significant cause of the
differential between commercial and government production.
All of the surveys and studies mentioned above do have certain
features in common: they all mention the problem of government
specific standards and requirements and do not mention the FCA.
The fact that the FCA was not mentioned as a significant factor by the
very individuals it is allegedly driving out of the government con-
tracting business would indicate that the FCA is not the negative de-
terrent critics would have one believe it is.
283 See Kovacic, A Deterrent, supra note 4.
284 See DefenseLink, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Accompanying Report of the National Perform-
ance Review: Part 1, at 27 (1993) (visited Nov. 29, 1998) <http://defenselink.mil/
speeches/1995/t19950221.html>.
285 See DefenseLink, U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Must Re-Engineer Its Procurement
System Now (Prepared Statement of Colleen Preston, Deputy Undersecretary of De-
fense for Requisition Reform, to the House Government Reform and Oversight
Comm.) (Feb. 21, 1995) (visited Aug. 22, 1998) <http://defenselink.mil/speeches/
1995/t19950221-preston.html>.
286 See CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD., INTEGRATING COMMERCIAL AND MILI-
TARY TECHNOLOGIES FOR NATIONAL STRENGTH: AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE (1991).
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D. Reduction of Incentives at Just the Wrong Time
Particularly troubling about the critics' analysis is their failure to
account for the fact that the DOD is drastically scaling back the size of
its acquisition workforce.28 7 The following statement by Eleanor Hill,
Inspector General, Department of Defense, encapsulates the threat
and costs of downsizing the acquisitions workforce:
Maintaining public support for Defense programs requires
good contract management and prompt identification of any poten-
tial fraud. As personnel reductions in the acquisition workforce
have occurred, we have also seen reductions in programs for fraud
prevention, detection, and reporting. For example, I am very con-
cerned about the decrease in the number of fraud referrals that we
receive from the Defense Logistics Agency. Since 1995, the number
of referrals that we receive for procurement cases has dropped by
47 percent. This decrease is partially because the number of per-
sonnel in the Office of the General Counsel involved in fraud detec-
tion and referral at the Defense Logistics Agency has been cut from
15 to 3. As reform efforts continue to emphasize partnering with
industry, there also seems to be less emphasis at the working level
on reporting fraud. While we understand the many benefits of the
new emphasis on Government/industry teamwork, the Department
should not assume that procurement fraud no longer occurs. To
the contrary, our criminal investigators report that their proactive
undercover efforts regularly reveal significant fraudulent activity.
Unfortunately, due to the ongoing downsizing, those proactive ef-
forts are likely to be curtailed in the future and we are concerned
287 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Acquisition and Technology of the Senate Comm.
on Armed Services, 105th Cong. 22 (1998) (statement of Eleanor Hill, Inspector Gen-
eral, Department of Defense). A transcript of this hearing is available at <http://
wwv.senate.gov/-armed~services/statemnt/980318eh.htm>. During the hearing, In-
spector General Hill stated,
The acquisition workforce at DOD is undergoing a 47-percent reduction
from 617,000 personnel in 1989 to 329,000 in 2000 .... Unfortunately,
there has been no risk assessment or systematic determination on whether
needed process improvement, such as electronic contracting, will occur
before the personnel reductions are made. The General Accounting Office
has repeatedly reported that Defense contract management is a high risk
area. Nevertheless, both contracting staffs and audit resources have been
drastically reduced, and further reductions are planned. At the same time,
DOD plans to increase the contracting out of numerous functions, thus cre-
ating more contract administration workload. The DOD also plans to in-
crease its procurement budgets significantly in the coming years, spending
over $350 billion for fighter and attack aircraft alone. Both trends will in-
crease the need for effective contract award, administration, and audit.
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that DOD fraud awareness and detection programs will be unable to
adequately protect the many taxpayer dollars that fund DOD pro-
curement efforts.
Many advocates of drastic changes in Government acquisitions
practices are unaware of, or chose to ignore, the fact that procure-
ment fraud remains a threat to the DOD and the U.S. taxpayer.
288
This statement reveals what the critics refuse to acknowledge; the
incentive structure inherent in the 1986 amendments to the FCA ad-
dress the very issues that face the DOD and other government agen-
cies in their attempts to procure goods and services and thwart fraud.
With the recent trend of downsizing the Government, government
contracting laws must place a great economic incentive on contractors
to police and administer government contracts. This need for a
greater economic incentive to be placed on contractors follows from
the fact that there will be fewer government officials around to moni-
tor those contracts for fraud.
E. The Most Important Cost
Critics of the FCA contend that the amount of money recovered
by the government through FCA suits is more than offset by the
amount of money the government loses, as a result of over-deterrence,
through decreased competition and decreased quality of goods and
services. The recovery of monies by the government since the 1986
FCA amendments is no small sum. 28 9 Yet, that sum pales in compari-
son to the estimated amount of government funds lost to fraud each
year.290 While FCA critics point out that FCA proponents fail to in-
clude the costs of alleged over-deterrence in calculations about the
Act's success, critics fail to include the most significant benefit of the
FCA in their calculations: bolstering of public confidence in the insti-
tutions of government.
The cost of fraud cannot always be measured in dollars and cents,
however. GAO pointed out in its 1981 report that fraud erodes public
confidence in the Government's ability to efficiently and effectively
manage its programs. Even in cases where there is no dollar loss-for
288 Id. at 22-23.
289 As of 1999, the United States government had recovered some $6 billion under
the FCA. See Peter Aronson, Supreme Court's Qui Tam Case Is Having an Impact, NAT'L
L. REv., Dec. 20, 1999, at A9.
290 The Department of Justice estimated that fraud consumes between one and
10% of the budget each year. See S. REP. No. 99-345 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.S.C.A.N. 5266.
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example where a defense contractor certifies an untested part for
quality yet there are no apparent defects-the integrity of quality re-
quirements in procurement programs is seriously undermined.
291
Although no one can attach a hard and fast number to this cost, the
effects of decreased public confidence in government are not easily
dismissed.
The FCA in its present configuration not only brings in revenue
and deters future fraud, it helps increase public confidence in govern-
ment by demonstrating to citizens that government institutions, with
the help of citizens, can and do effectively police their own programs.
This effect alone, although not quantifiable, may be the most impor-
tant benefit of the FCA in the long run. A decrease in the Act's effec-
tiveness caused by an increase in the burden of proof standard may
cause much more harm than what adding a couple of contractors to
the government roles is worth.
VI. CONCLUSION
The original enactment of the FCA was the federal government's
first attempt at deterring contracting abuses that affected the national
fisc and the nation's security. The 1986 amendments to the FCA rep-
resent the federal government's dear understanding that the circum-
stances surrounding the government purchase of goods and services
in general, and by the military in particular, have changed dramati-
cally. Despite the emphatic calls by critics of the FCA to reshape the
Act, their arguments do not accurately portray why the FCA's 1986
amendments were enacted in the first place.
First, as pointed out by this Article, the history of the burden of
proof standard indicates that the "clear and convincing" standard for
civil fraud is a creation of the courts of equity. This intermediate stan-
dard was a response to the perceived, but not empirically proven,
supposition that equity courts would become the domain of unmer-
itorious civil fraud cases. The standard was later adopted by some
state law courts when the courts of law and equity merged in this
country. Thus, nothing in our legal history mandates that "prepon-
derance of the evidence" should not be the standard for a statute
aimed at not only fraud but false claims.
Second, many states, including California, the seventh largest
economy in the world, have adopted the "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard for civil fraud cases without any apparent deleterious
effects on the interactions of private sector commercial parties. In
291 Id.
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fact, besides the states that presently have the preponderance stan-
dard for civil fraud cases, many states have enacted and are in the
process of enacting FCA-like statutes that include a "preponderance"
burden of proof standard.
Third, the military procurement system, which may account for
two-fifths of the federal government's discretionary budget, has none
of the incentives that exist in the private commercial sector with re-
gard to monitoring contracts for fraud. The military procurement sys-
tem is not a profit driven system, like that of the private commercial
sector. As indicated in this Article, the participants in the military pro-
curement process (Congress, the DOD, the individual services, and
personnel within those services) work under an entirely different set
of incentives and constraints than those of the private sector. In order
to deter fraud and false claims, the laws that regulate this system must
reflect that different reality.292
Fourth, some of the data on the actual number of contractors
doing business with the government suggests that the statute is not
causing the overdeterrence the critics contend it should.
In sum, the FCA and its burden of proof standard are rational
responses to a government procurement system that bears little re-
semblance to the commercial sector. Thus, the FCA should retain its
"preponderance" burden of proof standard.
292 Members of industry have recently suggested changes to the False Claims Act,
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (1994):
Some of those who have called for changes in the Act claim that commercial
contractors will not do business with the Government because they fear that
if they make a simple mistake and submit incorrect or erroneous documen-
tation to the Government they will be treated like criminals and accused of
defrauding the Government.... I note that we have seen no evidence of
such misuse of the statute from those making these arguments. Secondly
[sic], their argument ignores the clear reading of the statute. A simple mis-
take does not amount to a false claim subject to the False Claims Act.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Acquisition and Technology of the Senate Comm. on Armed
Services, 105th Cong. 24-25 (1998) (statement of Eleanor Hill, Inspector General, De-
partment of Defense). A transcript of this hearing is available at <http://ww.
senate.gov/-armedservices/statemnt/980318eh.htm>.
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Appendix A: Defense Budget
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Appendix B: Total Number of Defense Contractors
with Contracts Exceeding $25,000
Year
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Sources: Number of DOD Prime Contractors with Awards of $25,000 or More by Types of Business (visited
Apr. 21, 2000) <http.//webl.whs.osd.mil/peidhomeprotrend/prochist/typebus.htm>; Fax from Washington
Headquarters Service Directorate for Informations Operations and Reports to John Rosenthal, Federal Practice
and Procedure Editor, Notre Dame Law Review 2 (Feb. 11, 1999) (on file with author).
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